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ABSTRACT 
Finding Equilibrium on the Internet: How Chinese Netizens and the Regime  
Navigate Social Media Censorship 
(Under the direction of Dr. Weixing Chen) 
 
China’s current social media landscape consists of the most users in the world 
operating within the most extensive governmental censorship apparatus in the world, 
which over time has created a shaky balance between personal expression and 
institutional order. This thesis attempts to shed light on an understudied, potentially 
sensitive topic by exploring the multifaceted relationship between Chinese Internet users 
and the communist regime in terms of content surveillance. By examining the current 
Internet environment, assessing the opportunities and challenges the web provides users 
and the regime, implementing a survey with sixteen Chinese netizens, and conducting a 
literature review, this thesis posits that the previously described current balance works 
because of the state’s centuries-long history with censorship and the general support of 
regulation from Internet users. After expounding upon these topics, this thesis finds that 
the rising influence of Chinese netizens may result in a detrimental shift in the balance 
between expression and order, in which censorship should eventually diminish.  
 
  
5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6 
PART TWO: THE CURRENT CHINESE INTERNET LANDSCAPE . . . . . . . . . . .   8 
PART THREE: THE INTERNET’S OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR 
NETIZENS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20 
Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 
Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 
PART FOUR: THE REGIME’S RESPONSE TO THE INTERNET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
Opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34  
Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
PART FIVE: FINDING EQUILIBRIUM ON THE INTERNET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
Past Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 
Future Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
Primary Research on Internet Equilibrium Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
Regime​ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 
Netizens​ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  69 
Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  70 
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  74  
PART SIX: ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  89 
APPENDIX  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Deng Xiaoping, an influential leader within the Chinese Communist Party for 
decades, articulated that “If you leave a window open for fresh air, you have to expect 
some flies to come in,” meaning negative consequences will inevitably result from 
uncontrolled expression (Minzner, 2014). Though censorship has been a longstanding 
component of China’s history largely due to the regime’s appetency for centralized 
authority, the more recent introductions of Internet and social media into society have 
diversified the ways in which content regulation exists and affects individuals and 
organizations.  
This research explores the increasingly complex relationship between Chinese 
netizens and social media censorship that stems from the current communist regime. By 
examining existing literature and conducting primary research, this thesis will posit that 
today’s Chinese Internet users and the communist regime have struck a balance between 
expression and control that renders censorship largely advantageous for society. This 
statement will be defended based upon the grounds that censorship is historically rooted 
in Chinese culture to the point in which Internet users would rather have some content 
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regulation than none. The thesis will furthermore assert that, even though the idea behind 
China’s world-class censorship apparatus could be exemplary for other countries, the 
current equilibrium maintains that the justification of social media censorship should not 
be permanent.  
This thesis will open with an analysis of the current social media landscape in 
China, first discussing the trends of Chinese Internet users and then digging into three of 
the nation’s leading social media platforms that have significantly impacted the way 
millions communicate. In order to explore the dual nature of the Internet, the proceeding 
part will discuss a sample of the opportunities and challenges that the Internet bestows 
upon Internet users, followed by a section on some of the opportunities and challenges 
the web provides the communist regime. The major arguments of this thesis with 
supporting rationale in the forms of secondary research and primary surveys will then be 
presented. Following the arguments, this thesis will include a literature review that 
explains findings and theories of scholars on the topics of social media censorship and 
relations between netizens and the regime. In the concluding section, an overall 
assessment of the research will be provided. 
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PART TWO: THE CURRENT CHINESE INTERNET LANDSCAPE 
The term ‘netizen’ is often used by individuals, companies, and the regime to 
describe a Chinese citizen who accesses the Internet. Some Chinese citizens also perceive 
the meaning of this term to embody one who actively advocates for freedom of speech in 
cyberspace, thus using the Internet as a means of independent self-expression in the midst 
of authoritarian governance. As a result, some individuals use this term to translate into a 
form of pride, while others use it literally, and still others will not use it at all. Regardless 
of the term’s connotation, the number of Internet users in China has skyrocketed since its 
1987 introduction as an email tool for a handful of scholars (Tai, 2012, p. 122). 
Netizen demographics over the past twenty years reveal that the Internet has 
become increasingly inclusive within Chinese society. In 2000, men dominated 79% of 
the Internet landscape; however, this online gender gap decreased significantly by 2009, 
in which male users comprised 53% of cyberspace and women totalled 47% (Chi, 2012). 
Furthermore, 84% of netizens in 2000 either attended junior college or a four-year 
university, but by 2009, almost 75% of Internet users possessed educations at the high 
school level or below. In 2009, however, a digital divide of 71.7% urban users as 
opposed to 28.3% rural users was evident across netizens, which is a trend that still exists 
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to a much smaller degree. According to the same source, in 2000 and 2009 alike, around 
16% of Internet users were ages forty and older.  
Data from the past five years alone reveals that the Internet is still mostly 
common among young, educated adults, as access to the Internet in rural areas and in 
schools expands (China, 2018). Statistics from January 2012 reveal that China boasted 
around 500 million netizens, which equates to almost 40 percent of the nation’s 
population at this time (China, 2018). Predominant users in 2012 were young males, 
young adults, and high school graduates who access the Internet from mobile devices or 
desktops. Six years later in August 2018, the number of active Chinese netizens had 
surpassed 800 million, which accounts for almost 58% of the country’s population, 
making it the world’s largest Internet user powerhouse (McCarthy, 2018). Not only does 
China have the biggest Internet base, but it also exemplifies the most active one, with 
91% of online users also having social media accounts, in contrast to 67% of Internet 
users in the United States (Wang, 2016). This trend may be due to the fact that 98% of 
China’s netizens access the Internet from a mobile device, from where today’s online 
accounts are mostly utilized (McCarthy, 2018). 
Starting with electronic bulletin board systems (BBS) like​ ​sina.com​ and 
sohu.com​, cyberspace has paved the way for social media platforms that allow 
individuals, organizations, and businesses to be connected with ease and efficiency (Ye, 
Xu, & Zhang, 2017). According to Ye et al., such basic chatting software was initially 
used at universities, starting in the late 1990s, and gradually expanded to social groups, 
which has paved the way for today’s more complex sites that allow photos, blogging, 
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status updates, music, news, and videos. The same authors assert that social platforms 
with these functions, such as WeChat, QQ, and Weibo, have grown to create a public 
sphere, in which “people can exchange ideas freely through meetings, debates, dialogues 
and discussions” that encourage two-way conversations and exploration of questions (Ye, 
et al., 2017, p. 8). The advances in Internet and social media thus allow Chinese netizens 
to contribute to and be members of an even greater shared culture, in which any 
individual with Internet access can participate. 
 The purposes of using social media platforms are relatively the same worldwide; 
for example, Chinese netizens want to build social and professional interconnectivity, or 
guanxi​, just as users outside of China want to create networks and relationships. Users in 
China desire to “gain face,” or increase a positive viewpoint of oneself through social 
media, which is similar to the broad netizen drive to gain followers and likes (Wang, 
2016, p. 45). An analysis of the distinct domestic platforms WeChat, QQ, and Sina 
Weibo will demonstrate how netizens in China effectively exercise their free speech and 
expression within the parameters enforced by the regime.  
WeChat, originally called “Weixin,” is a comprehensive service created by the 
media corporation Tencent, in which users can text, call, send voice messages, share 
videos and multimedia, read articles, exchange money, order food, and even call taxis 
through one common application (Wang, 2016). Its 2011 launch attracted Internet users 
in droves, as the platform allowed individuals to send instant messages free of the 
charges that are imposed by the state-owned cell phone corporation (Chen, 2018). This 
platform grew astronomically, totalling 50 million users before the end of its first year 
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(Chen, 2018). As of 2019, there are over one billion WeChat accounts in China, as users 
have the ability to create multiple accounts (Yuan, 2019, para. 2), thus quickly proving 
itself to be the most popular messaging application in the Asia-Pacific region (Wang, 
2016). Though this platform expands across China, WeChat is usually used by urban, 
young adults with relatively higher levels of education, as individuals aged eighteen to 
thirty-five comprise around 85% of its total user base (Wang, 2016). There are a number 
of factors that led to its rapid success among Chinese netizens and beyond its borders. 
As previously mentioned, WeChat dominated the social media scene within years, 
which is largely because the application is smartphone-based. Tencent recognized the 
potential for WeChat to flourish as smartphones began expanding to wider audiences in 
China; as a result, the application was created to intentionally grow proportionally with 
the influx of smartphones. Many other applications were based on desktops--including 
QQ, which will be discussed later in this section--so these companies had to allocate 
time, funds, and employees to meet demands of the growing smartphone market, which 
WeChat skipped altogether by launching directly on a mobile platform (Wang, 2016).  
WeChat grew in popularity not only because it is smartphone-based, but because 
it also employs a function uncommon to Chinese netizens: voice messaging. In 2015, 
almost 85% of its netizens used WeChat specifically for this function, which grew 
especially among the elderly, disabled, illiterate, semi-illiterate, and foreign populations 
who may have difficulty expressing themselves in Mandarin (Wang, 2016). This 
innovation that was made easily available to the public did not come with unanimous 
support, with some saying it is only appropriate in intimate relationships, others saying it 
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is downright disturbing, and yet others saying it improves their oratory skills (Wang, 
2016). Nevertheless, this function provided the platform a larger user base, as WeChat 
users totaled around 280 million recorded minutes by 2015 (Wang, 2016). Because 
WeChat offers many personalized ways to communicate and share money, it also 
possesses higher privacy and a low degree of anonymity in which real names and the 
desire to be professional are much more common on WeChat than on other accounts. 
In addition to the structure for smartphones and the unique features for including 
netizens, WeChat is widely attractive because it is visually oriented. In 2012, more 
features were added to the platform so users could share photos within a Moments 
category, which is similar to Facebook’s timeline, as well as in a Photo Album (Chen, 
2018). While using the Moments feature, netizens can publicize up to nine photos at a 
time to an unlimited amount of people, to which recipients of this data can respond with 
links or comments (Chen, 2018). Typically, a sender has to post a photo before a text box 
pops up to create personal content, so images are widely circulated on this platform, 
much like the Western applications Instagram or Tumblr. Though updates were created in 
which users can select a pure text option, thereby opting out of uploading a photo or 
video and posting only words, very few people use this function or are even aware of its 
existence. Communicating such visually-oriented information through the Moments and 
Photo Album features allows individual netizens to send messages to a limitless amount 
of people, but the messages must be specifically accepted by the sender (Chen, 2018).  
Netizens are also drawn to WeChat because it operates within a closed 
community, in which information can be transferred from an individual to a small group 
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where there is greater trust and familiarity (Chen, 2018). For example, to add a friend, it 
is necessary to scan a QR code, enter in someone’s personalized and permanent WeChat 
ID, or utilize a phone number. WeChat users can also stimulate discussion through the 
formation of group chats. The size of these chats are limited by Tencent, initially starting 
out at a maximum of forty people, but these sizes had expanded to a maximum of 500 
members by 2016 (Chen, 2018). Through the formation of these chats, netizens are able 
to unite “to organize and coordinate close-knit group activities that could address issues 
of great community concern,” such as shaping policies or advocating for civic 
engagement (Chen, 2018, p. 80). Though there are options in which users can arbitrarily 
add others based on different parameters—adding nearby users, shaking a device and 
connecting with someone around the world who is shaking his or her device 
simultaneously, or sending a “message in a bottle” to someone at random--many people 
realistically use this application to connect with family, friends, and colleagues (Wang, 
2016).  
Because of WeChat’s unparalleled consolidation of functions and features, this 
application has become irreplaceable in the lives of Chinese netizens. Over one-third of 
WeChat users spend at least four hours a day accessing the platform, which penetrates 
deeply into their private and professional lives to the point where other forms of 
interpersonal connection are no longer needed (Yuan, 2019). For example, a technology 
columnist based in Hong Kong writes that business meetings in China often have “a time 
when everybody takes out his or her phone and scans the WeChat QR codes of others to 
become friends,” which has rendered traditional forms of corporate communication, like 
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email or business cards, almost obsolete (Yuan, 2019, para. 9). Similarly, the platform’s 
widespread utilization of and adaptation to QR codes allowed Tencent to annex mobile 
payment methods, which simplifies purchasing experiences for netizens and reduces the 
need for traditional forms of payment, like cash or cards. As a result of WeChat’s 
infiltration into the daily lives of Chinese netizens to make their work and play easier, the 
platform is not likely to lose any traction with its stakeholders in the near future. 
Another social media powerhouse in China is QQ, a personal networking platform 
also owned by Tencent. Known for its logo displaying a winking penguin wearing a red 
scarf, this platform is often related to WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger, in which users 
can update statuses, write blogs, make payments, and share photographs, stickers, music, 
and videos with online contacts. In contrast to those who routinely access WeChat, QQ’s 
user base consists of a higher number of rural residents, since it does not require a phone 
number to register (Wang, 2016). Also unlike WeChat, QQ was initially created for 
desktop computers because it was developed alongside the rise of Internet to be released 
in 1999 (Tencent, 2019). Though the application was eventually transferred to mobile 
devices with the influx of the smartphone market, desktops allow QQ netizens to fully 
engage in the customization that brings many users to the platform. QQ boasts 861 
million monthly users that account for its ability to adapt to cultural demands and 
changes (Tencent, 2019).  
The customization that exists on QQ is an enormous component of Asia-Pacific 
social media culture (Wang, 2016). On this platform, netizens can create their own 
avatars, categorize their contact lists, and personalize web page models, background 
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pictures, and music, much like Western MySpace (Tencent, 2019). As a result of these 
netizens’ desire to customize and create more colorful, rich visuals and profile layouts, 
QQ demonstrates a high degree of anonymity within netizens’ usernames and 
photographs. For example, about 95% of QQ netizens do not use their real names but 
choose to substitute them for phrases, and some do not use a picture of themselves 
(Wang, 2016). However, regardless of how many times a user customizes his or her 
profile, every user has a QQ number that never changes and serves to identify and add 
friends.  
Since it was released twenty years ago, QQ employs a convergence culture in 
which many of its services were the first exposure Chinese netizens experienced to 
navigating various aspects of the Web. As one of the first widely-used media platforms, 
scholars assert that “QQ is the starting point of many people in China and their digital 
life,” whether that be instant messaging, sharing and displaying music programs, 
accessing gaming channels, and even utilizing shopping forums (Wang, 2016, p. 29). In 
2004, a hierarchical structure was launched in which the longer QQ users stayed logged 
into their accounts accessing any of these networking mechanisms, the higher the ranking 
users could earn (Wang, 2016). Since netizens want to gain face and see themselves in 
the most positive light possible, QQ users would stay online for hours a day and develop 
addictive habits that would limit their productivity. To combat this issue, QQ changed its 
policy to where users to where two hours of engagement a day counts as an active 
member. Despite these policy changes, QQ members utilize this platform to exert 
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creativity and potentially as an outlet to defy rules and boundaries of everyday life 
(Wang, 2016).  
A third example of the social media platforms dominating Chinese cyberspace is 
Sina Weibo, a personal publication site that is commonly related to Western Twitter. 
Many of Twitter’s same characteristics apply to Sina Weibo, such as using “@” to tag 
someone, typing “#” to create a hashtag, and posting a maximum number of characters 
that can be published to an infinite audience (Wang, 2016). This platform is widely used 
by rural residents who must span distances to effectively communicate, as well as 
celebrities who desire to contact large audiences or even netizens that they do not know 
personally. As previously discussed, this type of social media has been termed 
“microblogging,” which is a label that is commonly under debate since platforms made 
solely for blogging, like Western Blogger and WordPress, have been banned entirely 
within China’s borders.  
Though WeChat certainly allows netizens to generate conversations on political 
or social issues among friends or fellow group members, Weibo provides a better 
platform for open debate among a much larger, less personal audience. For example, 
virtually anyone on Weibo can read and respond to posts, whereas comments on WeChat 
public and personal accounts are only shared with the original poster and, consequently, 
are much more private (Chen, 2018). Furthermore, unlike WeChat, Weibo lists the 
number of followers each user possesses, thus insinuating whom Internet users should 
follow, admire, and heed. By distinguishing this information, Weibo effectively gives the 
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more popular, influential opinion leaders a louder voice, as opposed to ordinary netizens 
with fewer followers (Chen, 2018). 
Despite the opportunities Weibo presents as a public network that stimulates 
broad conversations, users of this platform are on the decline. Reasons for this decline 
include the governmental efforts like censorship that push against microblogging, and the 
influx of advertisements on the site, and the shift toward communication among close 
groups (Chen, 2018). After Sina Weibo became a subject of attempts to “clean up” the 
Internet starting in 2013, people can be jailed for spreading online rumors varying 
proportionally with how many times the content has been viewed, as previously 
discussed in this thesis. Since circulation of content on this application is extremely easy, 
many users do not want to take the risk of incarceration on personal publication platforms 
Sina Weibo (Wang, 2016, p. 52). Another factor that deters netizens from using Sina 
Weibo is the difficulty to build ​guanxi​, in that communication on this platform links 
strangers. Since platforms like WeChat and QQ encourage creating contacts with those in 
one’s area of study, family, or social circles, netizens tend to shift from Sina Weibo to 
either of the former platforms where tight-knit relationships are cultivated and 
encouraged.  
The rapid success of these platforms and the companies that produce them has not 
escaped the attention of the regime. Not only have various methodologies of censorship 
been implemented on these sites, which will be discussed in a following section, but the 
government also proposed the idea of purchasing “special management shares” in some 
of the country’s top communication firms in 2016 to further exert its influence (Yuan, 
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2017, para. 21). The concept of special management shares would offer a 1% government 
stake contingent upon representation on the boards and panels of social media firms to 
further review content (Zhong & Wee, 2017). While 1% seems like a small number, 
media moguls like Tencent and Weibo accrue hundreds of billions of dollars in market 
capitalization annually, so this stake in Tencent alone would cost over $4 billion (Yuan, 
2017). This plan has been met with mixed reviews, as some companies believed it would 
ultimately fade from the government’s agenda (Yuan, 2017). However, as smaller 
communication companies such as Tiexue and Zaker have offered stakes in accordance 
with this plan, other opinions hold that this type of government-sponsored deal “is a sign 
of things to come” in the future of social media and government relations (Zhong & Wee, 
2017, para. 4). 
An analysis of WeChat, QQ, and Sina Weibo reveals that Chinese netizens are 
able to perform a variety of functions that tie them to their respective social circles purely 
through utilizing domestic platforms. The universal communicative functions found on 
these platforms, such as the abilities to post status updates, add friends, and share photos 
or videos, allow users to express themselves in a number of ways and to build 
much-desired ​guanxi ​with other Chinese netizens. Though some Western outlets are 
blocked in their entirety, Chinese Internet users hardly access these platforms unless they 
travel abroad or purchase a virtual private network because the plethora of domestic 
platforms provides ​guanxi​ in ways superior to international platforms. Not only do 
millions more Chinese citizens access domestic platforms than those of Western descent 
to achieve the notion of ​guanxi​, but the Chinese platforms often provide a greater level of 
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function versatility and integration--such as the ability to pay for a meal, send a voice 
recording, or call a taxi all in one application--in which international platforms 
increasingly often use as a model. Though mainstream scholarship often asserts that the 
censorship of entire social media platforms is an infringement of netizens’ expression, 
netizens are able to effectively express their viewpoints and opinions through emerging 
techniques on hundreds of domestic social media sites. 
However, the rise of an engaged citizenship operating under the governance of an 
authoritative regime creates a push and pull force between netizens’ freedom of 
expression and the party’s desire to remain in control. With such rapid and widespread 
growth in the technology sector, the party has increased its role in regulating content on 
all levels of government to the point in which “there has been a reluctance to 
acknowledge the crucial role played by the central government, and also by local 
bureaucrats” in regards to censorship (Wang, 2016, p. 27). The Chinese Communist 
Party, Internet service providers, and netizens thus have a complex, multifaceted 
relationship in which freedom of online speech often falls into gray area, as the state and 
Internet providers are seeking their own interests while trying to balance the demands of 
their stakeholders (Han, 2018). The rise of the Internet in China has inspired collective 
mobilization and criticism of the regime, to which the government has adapted and 
developed regulatory apparatuses in an attempt to match the creativity and pluralization 
of netizens (Han, 2018). Consequently, the Internet has caused various opportunities and 
challenges for netizens in its roughly three decades of existence in China, which will be 
detailed in the next section.  
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PART THREE: THE INTERNET’S OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR 
NETIZENS 
The Internet in China presents itself as a double-edged sword, in which its rapid 
and widespread development both benefits and sometimes detriments those who utilize it. 
For example, the expansion of Internet undeniably brings advancements through 
efficiency and ease to the hundreds of thousands of users who communicate with one 
other, conduct complex research and exchange findings, and buy, sell, and trade products 
or services, among other functions. However, the freedom of online expression in a 
communist regime is inevitably met with regulations and limitations that assert the 
government’s authority and, consequently, bring various challenges to netizens. To best 
understand the multifaceted relationship between netizens, the regime, and the Internet, 
this dual nature of the Internet in China will be discussed in the following section, 
beginning with an exploration of its opportunities for netizens, including increased 
political engagement, boosted Internet commerce, and stimulated education. The section 
will conclude with the Internet’s challenges for netizens, focusing specifically on 
cybersecurity, censorship, and information quality. 
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Opportunities 
The Internet’s ability to span distances in order to link individuals, be they 
acquaintances, families, or strangers, allows the web to function as a modern political 
tool, connecting netizens to all levels of the government regardless of physical location. 
The Internet can effectively create this opportunity for netizens due to its unique, 
unprecedented characteristics of “activity, immediacy, extensiveness, openness, and 
richness” through increasingly creative, immersive platforms and content (Landtsheer et 
al., 2014, p. 345). The accessibility of cyberspace thus allows netizens to speak their 
minds through a variety of grassroots methods. For example, largely within the past 
decade, netizens have formed coalitions to create interactive online columns that offer 
their opinions, questions, proposals, and advice on policies or current events, such as the 
widely known “Netizen Hall” or “Questions for the Prime Minister” platforms, perhaps 
to praise, or perhaps to dissent. It is not uncommon for government officials to seek out 
content posted on these accounts in order to gauge public opinion and to communicate 
with citizens, similar to the ways in which officials will monitor and interact with content 
regarding governmental affairs that is posted on social media microblogs. This ability for 
netizens to voice their viewpoints on political processes alludes to what Landtsheer et al. 
refers to as “supervising government,” in which Internet users have a distinct capacity to 
check governmental authority in hopes of preventing corruption (2014, p. 353).  
Not only can netizens express their firsthand political views online, but they can 
become increasingly politically informed by tapping into the wealth of information 
already present in cyberspace. For example, Internet users have the ability to access 
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databases and logs of laws, news, regulations, demographics, geographic trends, and 
contact information of government authorities that were incomplete or infeasible to 
gather prior to the expansion of Internet. Furthermore, netizens have the opportunity to 
investigate the backgrounds, stances, and histories of their politicians and regulatory 
bodies, as almost 55,000 government websites have been registered as of 2014 
(Landtsheer et al., 2014). Because of the availability of pertinent content on the web, 
some scholars and politicians believe that, while cyberspace certainly has some 
drawbacks, the Internet is a mostly beneficial tool that links people to politics.  
As summarized by Landtsheer et al., there are five main ways the Internet 
provides political opportunities for netizens: First, civic participation is expanded because 
the Internet gives individuals easy ways to share their voices through a number of 
communication channels (2014). Second, it allows netizens to play an active role in 
shaping the policy-making process, rather than passively observing it. Third, the frequent 
flow of information on the Internet enhances political transparency, as news pertaining to 
laws or leaders can quickly be presented publicly. Forth, netizens can become more 
educated by accessing documents and databases on topics that interest them. Fifth, the 
Internet boosts socialization as it becomes an even wider used vehicle of political 
conversation. As a culmination of these trends, the Internet allows netizens to become 
more politically aware and active, presenting individuals with opportunities to engage 
with and learn about policies and the people who make them at different levels. A 2005 
survey on the Internet and political participation upholds Landtsheer’s arguments, which 
reveals that approximately 63% of the respondents say citizens better understand politics, 
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54% assert people have increased opportunities to discuss politics, and 45% believe 
people have stronger political power as a result of the Internet (Chi, 2012). These 
arguments and findings thus support the notion that the Internet serves as a link between 
the government and the people. 
Not only does the Internet allow netizens to increase their political engagement, 
but it also has also paved the way for the current e-commerce platforms that are now 
integral parts of netizens’ daily operations. As the mobile industry soars in China, nearly 
one in two Chinese citizens has taken to online buying and selling items and services 
online, predominantly through the usage of smartphones and tablets, as opposed to 
desktop computers (Shadbolt, 2014). With over 500 million mobile shoppers in 2018, 
China’s netizens totalled $1 trillion in online purchasing and accounted for almost 40% 
of global retail e-commerce, which demonstrates the significant economic influence the 
Internet provides Chinese netizens (Marinova, 2017). As Western e-commerce sites such 
as Amazon and eBay are largely unsuccessful in China, the country’s large population 
pours into thriving domestic platforms that link businesses and customers and that have 
provided over 3.3 million jobs as of 2017 (China: E-commerce). China’s e-commerce 
also successfully brings unique opportunities to netizens by essentially capitalizing upon 
the idea of a “one-stop shop” in forward-thinking ways that specifically tailor to the 
needs of consumers. To describe some of these opportunities, an analysis of two of 
China’s top e-commerce providers, Alibaba and JD.com (Jingdong), is provided.  
Alibaba and JD.com entered the e-commerce industry roughly twenty years ago, 
in 1999 and 1998 respectively, which was early enough to experience many of the same 
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competitive advantages that contribute to their continued success. Together, Alibaba and 
JD.com comprise more than 85% of China’s e-commerce market (Long, 2018). Both 
platforms offer netizens the ability to purchase a wide variety of items--ranging from 
apparel, electronics, luggage, toys, home furnishings, seafood, alcohol, flowers, and even 
certain minerals and chemicals--that can be ordered from a smartphone, processed 
through a complex logistics system, and immediately shipped to a netizen’s door, 
according to the Alibaba homepage. Though the platforms offer the same general buying 
and purchasing functions, they offer a number of different advantages to netizens. 
Boasting more than 600 million active monthly users, Alibaba emphasizes 
“e-tailing” by running the majority of its selling operations directly through the web, as 
opposed to physically retailing in stores (Mourdoukoutas, 2014). With such a large 
Internet user base, devoting funds and resources to e-tailing allows Alibaba to meet more 
netizens where they are so individuals can easily use the platform at their own 
convenience. Additionally, Alibaba has created separate internal sites with the intention 
of better marketing certain products to specific netizens, thus creating a specialized 
shopping experience based on an online consumer’s needs. For example, Taobao hosts 
cheaper products from smaller merchants, whereas Tmall offers brand name products that 
usually come with a bigger price tag, which allows netizens to see the advantage of 
accessing diverse products that are organized on inclusive sites.  
This platform also provides netizens the opportunity of networking, a traditional 
value of importance in China. Alibaba makes it easy for merchants to join their platform 
by relying on revenue sharing as opposed to listing fees, which brings increasing amounts 
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of merchants desiring to sell their products on the Alibaba website (Mourdoukoutas, 
2014). When the online network expands, “the greater the benefits for each merchant, as 
it attracts a large volume of customer traffic” through exposure and conversation 
(Mourdoukoutas, 2014, para. 10). Netizens then feel a sense of community by interacting 
with users of the same products and services across the Alibaba network. Internet users 
furthermore trust that they can freely interact with fellow customers and merchants on 
this e-commerce platform due to its positive relationship with the Chinese government, 
which is “the gatekeeper of the economy, deciding who will be in what business and for 
how long” (Mourdoukoutas, 2014, para. 11). As gatekeeper, the government allows many 
domestic e-commerce platforms to thrive and create profitable competition, including 
JD.com.  
JD.com is notorious for utilizing modern technology to best connect with its 
online customers, who amount to over 300 million per month (Laubscher, 2018). This 
e-commerce platform has its more than 550 warehouses, same- or next-day shipping 
logistics, and thousands of brick-and-mortar convenience stores to thank for its $67.2 
billion net revenue for 2018, in addition to its thriving online shopping site, according to 
its corporate blog. Avant-garde technological advancements, like artificial intelligence, 
big data, and robotics, are incorporated to propel JD.com ahead of other companies and 
to simplify the shopping process for netizens. For example, drones have been used since 
2016 to deliver packages, which effectively speeds shipping and generates conversation 
and interest among online shoppers (Marr, 2018). The company also uses technology to 
modernize the customer experience, in which data is used to profile customers by 
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tracking their tastes, interests, and trends to create a personalized e-commerce experience. 
While not affecting online shopping just yet, JD.com has also been working on payment 
through facial recognition model, in which convenience store shoppers would not even 
have to stop and pay through traditional methods in years to come (Marr, 2018). All of 
JD.com’s evolving technological implementations demonstrate that the company desires 
to provide the easiest and safest shopping experience possible for netizens, in which 
virtually any product can be purchased, shipping is revolutionized, counterfeits are 
terminated, and customer information is protected. As a result of online shopping 
platforms like Alibaba and JD.com, netizens have the opportunity to participate in the 
country’s flourishing e-commerce quite literally at the push of a button. 
Not only is the web an informative political instrument and an interactive 
economic stimulant that simplifies the daily lives of Chinese Internet users, but it also 
increases access to education and further connects the intellect of netizens across the 
country. In particular, students at all levels of education are able to experience the various 
opportunities provided by the Internet, especially after the 2015 introduction of the 
Internet Plus framework by premier Li Keqiang. According to one of Li’s Reports on the 
Work of the Government announcements, this policy serves “to integrate mobile Internet, 
cloud computing big data, and the Internet of Things with modern manufacturing, to 
encourage the healthy development of e-commerce, industrial networks, and Internet 
banking, and to get Internet-based companies to increase their presence in the 
international market,” which has largely been adapted to education within the past four 
years (Sharwood, 2015, para. 5). Home to the largest education system in the world with 
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260 million students and 15 million teachers, the Internet has had significant impacts 
among an influential population.  
The Internet has grown exponentially popular in classrooms and curriculum 
around the country since this legislation. For example, Internet access rates in primary 
and secondary schools have skyrocketed within the past five years alone, which now 
registers at an estimated 90% of schools, up from 25% in 2012 (Ying & Wanwei, 2017). 
Increased Internet access currently allows netizens to conduct more in-depth research, 
quickly share and publish their scholarship with others, apply for diverse schools, jobs, 
and scholarships, and take extra classes without a commute (Ying & Wanwei, 2017). Not 
only do netizens have greater capability than ever to learn from information on the web, 
but they are also exposed to a more immersive learning experience in the classroom 
because of the Internet’s adaptations to the needs and interests of students. Around 83% 
of classrooms now implement multimedia learning techniques, such as video and social 
media, that engage and resonate with learners, as opposed to the less than 40% in 2012 
(Ying & Wanwei, 2017). Responding to demand by students and parents, some schools 
have been established that combine these characteristics and are completely online, thus 
offering netizens around the country the ability to acquire an education with more 
personal authority.  
The Internet Plus policy intends for the web to reach wide audiences due to the 
common social nature of treating education as a “public service” (Ying & Wanwei, 
2017). Similarly, Du Zhanyuan, China’s Deputy Minister of Education, has said that the 
country will not only use the Internet to advance the quality of education, but it will 
28 
ensure equitable access to education across varying populations (Ying & Wanwei, 2017). 
For example, China has expanded the Internet to reach netizens who live in rural or 
impoverished areas where there are shortages of teachers and resources, providing them 
with unprecedented access to education through real-time tutoring sessions or online 
courses (Ying & Wanwei, 2017). The web has also been used to create profiles with 
personalized reports based on students’ abilities to process, diagnose, and analyze data, 
thus boosting online learners’ understanding of their own educational progress (Ying & 
Wanwei, 2017). As a result of these advancements, the Internet is used to create an even 
playing field with equal opportunities among learners within China’s borders.  
From this analysis, it can be concluded that the Internet certainly provides a great 
number of opportunities for the millions of netizens in China. Some of these benefits 
include various channels for political engagement and expression, numerous ways to 
participate in the nation’s thriving e-commerce, and efficient educational methodologies 
that are increasingly inclusive of China’s diverse citizenry. Though the opportunities for 
Chinese netizens are substantial, accessing a technically borderless Internet within the 
parameters set by an authoritarian regime also presents challenges for web users. A 
sample of these challenges consists of cybersecurity concerns, potential regulation of 
online content, and the debatable value and quality of information, which will be 
discussed in the remainder of this section. 
Challenges 
While the rapid expansion of the Internet has undoubtedly advanced Chinese 
society, sometimes growing pains persist, as “the malevolent side of cyberspace has 
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increased in hand hand with the growing scale use of the benevolent side” (Lieberthal & 
Singer, 2012, p. 2). The physical spread of the web and the increasing speed of its 
operations matched with China’s large population can create challenges for cybersecurity 
regulators, who are trying to keep in step with constant changes (Fei, 2011). Despite the 
protective efforts put forth by these regulators, several vulnerabilities and problems exist 
in China’s cyberspace that present concerns of data safety for netizens. For example, 
Chinese websites are likely to attract botnets, which can be described as “a group of 
computers infiltrated by a hacker and infected with malicious software, generally for the 
purpose of attacking other information systems” (Fei, 2011, p. 186). While millions of 
these botnets exist in countries across the globe, China was reported to have the largest 
number of infected computers as recently as 2017 and has lingered in the top three places 
for approximately the past ten years (Christ, 2017). As netizens share their data on 
increasing amounts of “smart” devices with Internet connection--such as televisions, 
watches, and tablets, to name a few--potentially sensitive, personal information is now 
more susceptible to hacking than ever with botnets continuing to infect, shut down, or 
exchange sites and servers. As a result, China may struggle to strike the balance between 
reaping the economic and social benefits of Internet expansion and protecting the 
personal data privacy of its netizens.  
Not only is netizens’ personal data continuously at risk from bots, but malicious 
attacks also compromise the information found on public accounts. Government websites 
and accounts in particular are victims of routine hacking, detected at an average rate of 
around 2,000 infiltrations per month (Fei, 2011). While it is not uncommon for countries 
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or even governments to experience cybersecurity vulnerabilities, continued hacking of 
the Chinese regime’s accounts may compromise the information consumed and trusted 
by netizens desiring to be informed. Though it is difficult to find reliable information 
regarding the origins of these cyber attacks, it is known that foreign hackers play a large 
role in infiltrating China’s sites and servers (Fei, 2011). Scholars predict that international 
cyberspace disunities are unlikely to be resolved soon, as the newness of the issue 
coupled with the weight of suspicion and threat of espionage it carries “is so 
overwhelming that it is unrealistic to seek cooperative arguments” at the time (Lieberthal 
& Singer, 2012, p. 32). The lack of mutual trust among nations thus prevents making 
significant progress in international cybersecurity cooperation, leaving assurance and 
safety of netizens’ data in suspension.  
In addition to information and cybersecurity uncertainties, the Internet also brings 
challenges to netizens through the censorship of online content. Though the Internet 
certainly provides numerous outlets for the free expression that is guaranteed to citizens 
in China’s constitution, numerous restrictions apply to the ways in which netizens can 
access and utilize the web. Generally, the Communist Party of China regulates Internet 
content or platforms that are capable of reaching a wide audience, which includes certain 
newspapers, films, music, pornography, games, television, radio, books, search engines, 
and online businesses that diverge from the regime’s political and social status quo.  
From an international perspective, the censorship of information detriments 
Chinese netizens because they are deprived of a wealth of information regarding the 
surrounding world and the country in which they live. For example, the blockade of 
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certain international news outlets limits Chinese netizens’ knowledge of events, ideas, or 
opinions that may be seen as inappropriate or sensitive by the regime, such as 
information on the religious Falun Gong movement or the pro-democracy protests at 
Tiananmen Square. Such a pattern repeats itself in books pertaining to China’s history 
that may be banned due to the ways in which certain events, such as the deaths resulting 
from the Great Chinese Famine between 1959 and 1961, were described and represented. 
The same logic follows in the government’s reasoning for censorship of Western search 
engines, social media platforms, and international online shopping platforms, thus 
preventing Chinese netizens from being exposed to global conversations, social norms, 
and viewpoints that may oppose those of the regime. As a result of its restrictive nature, 
Western scholarship often condemns Internet censorship as a preeminent challenge upon 
netizens.  
While some Chinese netizens might agree with the common Western viewpoint 
that censorship of Internet content is rather amoral and disadvantageous, it is common for 
Chinese citizens and scholars to support censorship and perceive different challenges that 
are largely technical. For example, simply the general inability to access a website, show, 
or game is more frustrating for some Internet users than the fact that specific content is 
being withheld from them. Those Internet users who support censorship are also likely to 
willingly accept these types of difficulties imposed by censorship because they believe 
regulation is mostly advantageous for society and worth some drawbacks. Additionally, 
still other users may be unaware of censorship or its consequences, possibly thinking a 
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banned site or platform is experiencing internal difficulties and seeing it as more of an 
inconvenience than an intentional institutional block.  
Not only does the Internet present challenges to users that stem from 
cybersecurity and censorship, but the quality and value of information is also a 
controversial challenge for netizens. While censorship certainly exists within Chinese 
cyberspace, in which information is blocked and filtered by pro-regime actors, another 
challenge for netizens lies in determining whether or not receiving partial information is 
really equivalent to being truthfully informed. While the regime upholds that censorship 
allows China to promote what is acceptable and hide what is corruptible, an Internet user 
might find that the truth will be illuminated through government’s traditional, righteous 
protection of content. On the other hand, a netizen may believe that access to only 
acceptable information and restriction from harmful or sensitive information is hardly 
truthful at all, and still others fall somewhere on the middle of this spectrum. The varying 
viewpoints on the truth demonstrate the challenge netizens face between determining 
traditional values within the government’s responsibility and their own personal 
autonomy online.  
Though there are numerous tangible benefits that stem from the cyberspace in 
China, several challenges are also present for today’s netizens as the Internet continues to 
expand. The balance between utilizing freedom of speech on the Internet while not 
straying from the boundaries set by the regime is difficult to achieve, as many 
comprehensive policies from numerous governing bodies detail abilities and limitations 
of netizens and content providers but can still be rather ambiguous in practice. As a 
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result, Chinese netizens may be left asking, how much free speech on the Internet is too 
much free speech, and where does the line need to be drawn? In attempt to best 
understand and develop this query, the following section will analyze the regime’s 
responses to opportunities and challenges created by the Internet.  
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PART FOUR: THE REGIME’S RESPONSE TO THE INTERNET 
Just as the Internet brings opportunities and opposition to Chinese netizens, so the 
double-edged nature of cyberspace also affects the authoritarian regime itself in both 
advantageous and challenging ways that often overlap those impacting netizens. 
Examples of the Internet’s opportunities for the regime include the ability to harness the 
web as a political communication tool, as an e-commerce stimulant, and as a mechanism 
of supremacy over netizens. On the other hand, the Internet brings various challenges for 
the regime that center around the formidable task of implementing the most extensive 
censorship apparatus in the world. As a result of the push and pull essence of the Internet, 
it is necessary for the regime to find the balance between the freedom of information 
access and the country’s historic content control. The responses from the regime to these 
opportunities and challenges will be provided in this section.  
Opportunities 
A prominent benefit of Internet expansion is that the regime increasingly uses the 
web as a political communication tool to engage netizens. Through social media, like 
WeChat or Weibo in particular, the government can interact with netizens in 
unprecedented ways by creating accounts for individual politicians, bureaucracies, or 
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councils to post information on behalf of their respective organizations. In addition to 
increasing the regime’s access and transparency, the creation of government social media 
accounts allows the state to become better informed of citizens’ political demands, 
expectations, questions, or doubts. For example, the regime is able to gauge public 
opinion by following the “likes” and “shares” of post analytics in order to detect, in real 
time, what policies or issues netizens currently support or oppose. Similarly, the 
government can understand the broader viewpoints of netizens by reading--and even 
responding to--netizens’ conversations and debates on current events with other Internet 
users. Interacting with netizens on social media also allows the regime to stay abreast of 
conversations with collective action potential, such as political protests and 
demonstrations, that may attempt to gain grassroots support across cyberspace. Social 
media thus allows the state to stay in sync with its constituents and efficiently craft 
policies and resolutions in response to their interests. In response to these trends, 55% of 
Chinese believe the government better serves the public and 60% say the regime better 
appreciates the public’s viewpoints by implementing the Internet into political 
communication​ ​(Chi, 2012, p. 395).  
Aside from social media, state-run media also presents opportunities for the 
regime to connect with netizens on political issues. These platforms allow the state to 
control the language and tone with which news is disseminated, thus resulting in potential 
modifications to political news coverage in favor of the regime’s agenda. While 
numerous independent news outlets exist today, examples of these respected, vital state 
platforms include the Xinhua news agency and the ​People’s Daily ​newspaper, which are 
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two of China’s largest, most accessed media organizations, regardless of ownership​. ​By 
supplying daily coverage on politics in multiple languages, the state is able to use these 
websites to reach millions of diverse netizens all over the world on the happenings in 
Beijing, while often excluding anti-regime sentiment and events from stories. As a result 
of these influential state-owned multimedia platforms, netizens are exposed to content 
that the People’s Republic of China deems credible and consequential with the click of a 
button. The regime thus uses social media and traditional media to maintain political 
stability by promoting acceptable messages to society (Chi, 2012, p. 396). 
In addition to utilizing the Internet as a political communication mechanism, the 
regime also responds to the influx of cyberspace by capitalizing upon the opportunities of 
China’s successful internal e-commerce. As previously discussed, China supports the 
healthy competition between domestic e-commerce platforms, such as Alibaba and 
JD.com, that provide efficient, personalized shopping experiences for netizens. Perhaps 
more importantly to the regime, however, this competition has largely weeded out foreign 
contenders, which leaves China completely dominating its own market for online 
retailers. The state furthermore reaps the financial benefits that result from this domestic 
supremacy, with retail e-commerce revenue totalling $636 billion as of 2018 and is 
projected to cross $1 trillion by 2022 (E-commerce revenue). Though international 
competitors like Amazon and eBay are available in China, they have been unable to 
resonate with Chinese consumers, causing Amazon’s market share in China to plummet 
to 1.3% in 2016 and eBay to be considered by many news outlets as a failure (Lin & 
Stevens, 2017). Thus, netizens’ neglect of international powerhouses and loyalty to 
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domestic shopping sites has played a significant role in the acceleration of China’s 
economy. As these sites soar in revenue and mobile payment grows increasingly popular 
in China, it is no surprise that the regime has the Internet to thank for becoming one of 
the world’s commerce leaders in less than a decade (Marinova, 2017).  
Not only does the regime experience the Internet’s opportunities in terms of 
political engagement and e-commerce growth, but it also takes advantage of cyberspace 
by utilizing the web as an agent of supremacy over netizens and even content providers. 
As previously mentioned, China has developed extensive methodologies of Internet 
regulation that permit the state to withhold or mandate certain information from Chinese 
citizens, which serves as an intentional reminder of government authority. Though these 
methodologies will be detailed in the following section, some methods include the often 
required registration of Internet platforms and user data with the government. Since 
straying from the boundaries set by the regime will likely be met with formal or informal 
consequences, content providers often participate in asserting self-discipline within the 
Internet industry, in which they can submit a legal document to pledge allegiance to 
willingly follow rules in order to find favor with the state. Content providers thus 
participate in these methods of self-discipline to evade consequences from the regime, 
which places the power of the Internet in the hands of the Chinese government.  
Not only has the regime made complying with regulations appealing to Internet 
service providers to emphasize its own authority, but it also has extended this mindset to 
netizens in order to monitor their data. WeChat, for example, dominates China’s social 
media landscape because it offers essentially every possible function on one application, 
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as it is “the equivalent of WhatsApp plus Facebook plus PayPal plus Uber plus GrubHub 
plus many other things,” rendering other platforms insufficient (Yuan, 2019, para. 1). In 
order to acquire the most optimal experience from these full-service Internet platforms, 
netizens enter seemingly limitless personal data such as addresses, locations, credit card 
numbers, dining preferences, voice recordings, political preferences, search histories, and 
passwords, into the electronic system. However, like WeChat, some Internet platforms 
“provide the government with an unprecedented glimpse into the lives of Chinese 
citizens--what they discuss, how they spend money, and where they gather” 
(McLauchlin, 2017, para. 4). As a result of this relationship, almost a billion netizens 
willingly offer a consolidation of their personal information to surveillance from the 
state, which again points to the regime’s supremacy over the Internet.  
Though the Internet provides the regime these opportunities and many others, 
such as accelerated scholarship and cohesion among different levels of government, the 
regime faces the arduous task of enforcing censorship within cyberspace that serves the 
highest number of Internet users in the world. The regime therefore faces the challenge of 
finding the balance between what to censor, what to allow, and what conversations will 
define Chinese society in its past, present, and future. As the regime has characteristically 
regulated expression in order to guide the public understanding of news and history, the 
regime may not see censorship itself as a challenge; rather, the intensive, laborious, and 
costly enforcement of censorship is undoubtedly challenging when time and resources 
could potentially be allocated elsewhere. The following section thus describes censorship 
in the Chinese context, with the challenge for the regime deriving from the strenuous 
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implementation of Internet censorship and the need to strike a balance between 
expression and authority. 
Challenges 
China began to utilize the Internet after many Western nations, but regime 
leadership eventually came to believe that harnessing the potential of the Internet would 
benefit China domestically and internationally, resulting in the country’s ability to 
establish an influential economy and a solidified national identity (Tai, 2012). According 
to Tai, the regime asserted that expanding Internet access would help the country catch 
up to and potentially even surpass the economies of other countries by providing jobs, 
generating productivity, and stimulating a continuous notion of self-improvement. As 
“the Chinese government has supported the development of the Internet as a tool for 
business, entertainment, education, and information exchange,” methods to control it 
were almost simultaneously developed from the federal government (MacKinnon, 2008, 
p. 31). Regardless of surveillance mechanisms, China’s adaptation and commercialization 
of the Internet among entrepreneurs and corporations led to the nation’s current rank as 
the fastest-growing economy in the world. 
Because the Internet is technically borderless, Tai also writes that the regime 
wanted to control access to certain information to create an Internet presence that adheres 
to China’s unique cultural and social views (2012). Since the century of humiliation that 
officially ended in 1949, which comprised China’s struggle to determine its identity and 
reach international reputability, party leadership avoids legitimizing means that might 
compromise its power as a nation or its cohesive identity. Therefore, the regime also 
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encourages usage of the Internet to create and promote its own national identity as the 
number of Internet users within the country climbs. As the Internet certainly brings 
numerous benefits to the regime, like the previously mentioned bolstered economy and 
upheld unified identity, the expansion of cyberspace has provided challenges for the 
Chinese regime as Internet access expands. 
As previously mentioned, governmental censorship in the People’s Republic of 
China includes all content with the capability of circulation, whether that be television, 
broadcast or print journalism, theater, radio, literature, instant messaging, or the Internet. 
The Communist Party of China holds that censorship of Internet content in particular is a 
legal duty that does not conflict with recognized rights of the citizenry, such as freedom 
of press or speech (Wang, 2016). The censorship of netizens’ free expression on social 
media platforms has unequivocally affected Chinese society in various ways. 
In contrast to media in the United States, in which a handful of prominent content 
providers resemble an oligarchy in the country’s social media landscape, hundreds of 
local websites comprise China’s Internet presence (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013). Just as 
China’s Internet content is fragmented, so the regime’s patrolling of these sites is 
fragmented across local, provincial, and national levels of authority in response to federal 
legislation. The Cyberspace Administration of China, the Central Propaganda Office, and 
the State Council Information Office are three examples of the numerous federal 
institutions that create censorship policies concerning Chinese netizens and Internet 
service providers. 
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When Internet access began to expand to Chinese citizens in the late 1990s, 
federal policies were quickly promulgated to harness the potential of the Internet. The 
detailed legislation that provides a large part of the backbone for Chinese Internet 
censorship is entitled the ​Computer Information Network and Internet Security, 
Protection and Management Regulations​, stemming from the Ministry of Public Security. 
Since its inception in 1997, the guidelines affect every online network inside the 
country’s boundaries, specifying what netizens may not utilize the Internet to do, whether 
acting in groups or as private individuals (Computer, 1997). Directly according to Article 
5 of this act, netizens may not intend to damage online networks or generate the 
following content: 
(1) Inciting to resist or breaking the Constitution or laws or the implementation of 
administrative regulations;  
(2) Inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system;  
(3) Inciting division of the country, harming national unification;  
(4) Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the unity of 
the nationalities;  
(5) Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying the 
order of society;  
(6) Promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gambling, 
violence, murder;  
(7) Terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity; openly insulting other people 
or distorting the truth to slander people;  
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(8) Injuring the reputation of state organs;  
(9) Other activities against the Constitution, laws or administrative regulations.” 
The act additionally requires Internet service providers to adhere to surveillance 
and guidance from the governing council and to keep a log of violations on each 
platform. Furthermore, netizens must register accounts with legitimate identities so 
content providers can keep an updated record of netizen information to report to the 
Ministry of Public security if necessary. The​ Administrative Measures on Information 
Services​, issued by Order Number 292 in 2000, creates more specific guidelines for 
Internet service providers to follow, such as licensing systems, business plans, and 
safeguarding measures for netizen safety (Administrative, 2000). Both policies remain 
influential in providing legal basis for institutional censorship that is subject to the 
discretion of the regime. 
For example, the first piece of legislation includes a rather broad clause that 
creates a provision for federal Internet censorship, which states that the “Public Security 
computer management and supervision organization should establish a system for 
ensuring the security, protection, and good management of the connecting network units, 
entry point units and users” (Computer, 1997, Article 17). This loose phrase allows the 
regime to exercise surveillance across the local, provincial, and federal levels through 
various mechanisms that will later be discussed, such as hand-censorship, keyword 
blocking and the Great Firewall. 
Though federal institutions mandate these policies, King, et al. asserts that 
intermediary actors such as Internet service providers and educational institutions act as 
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the enforcing bodies of the regime’s censorship guidelines (2013). According to Han, the 
state chooses to utilize these agents to divert blame and backlash from regulation away 
from the party itself (2018). When deciding whether to comply with or resist the regime’s 
regulations, these bodies must consider and balance the interests of their stakeholders, 
one of which is the party, with administrative authority over what content stays and what 
goes; the netizens, who keep a social media platform running; and the organization, 
which is trying to survive. Han thus suggests that intermediary actors often exercise 
“discontented compliance,” in which they know it is too costly to resist the regime, but 
these bodies may involuntarily implement various censorship mechanisms on their 
platforms (2018, p. 60). 
As the Internet evolves into a more necessary and inclusive apparatus that 
connects individuals, organizations, and global citizens, so the regime has created diverse 
mechanisms of patrolling China’s expanding cyberspace. Whereas some governments 
implement a rather laissez-faire approach to the influx of social media, the Chinese 
regime has effectively combined policy and technological measures in effort to control 
potential disorder or loss of central authority within society. Common methods of modern 
censorship include preventative measures, manual censorship, keyword blocking, user 
surveillance, immersive measures, and self-censorship.  
Perhaps the most recognizable example of state control of Chinese Internet is 
known as the Great Firewall of China, which was officially entitled the Golden Shield 
Project (McDonald, 2016). With work on the project beginning in 1999, Fang Binxing 
championed what would become the Great Firewall with the assistance of multiple 
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agencies; as a result, censorship quickly increased as the number of Internet users 
skyrocketed after 2002 (The art, 2013). This preventative measure creates a holistic 
blockade between netizens and entire websites or networks by requiring all content 
coming through Chinese cyberspace to face strict subject analysis (Tai, 2012). Sites 
blocked from Chinese Internet include Facebook, Google, Youtube, WordPress, 
Snapchat, Instagram, Bloomberg, and ​The New York Times​, among others. This 
preventive form of censorship is largely automatic in that its routers discover sets of 
blacklisted keywords, causing the Great Firewall to sever connection between the netizen 
and the site he or she was attempting to access (MacKinnon, 2018, p. 41). After the 
connection is terminated, users are taken to a screen informing them of that webpage’s 
unavailability and are frozen on that page for ninety seconds. Content may be blocked if 
the regime deems it undesirable or unwanted, thus demonstrating China’s intention to 
proactively shape and create a “management of popular opinion” (Han, 2018, p. 5). 
Chinese netizens have thus created and utilized local social media platforms, like RenRen 
and Sina Weibo among a wealth of others, that offer Chinese netizens relatively the same 
functions and the ability to express themselves (King et al., 2013).  
According to Tai, netizens may utilize technological advances—such as computer 
applications and virtual private networks like Tor, Freenet, and Triangleboy—in attempt 
to evade the Great Firewall’s content blockades (2012). The same source states that 
within the past decade, the regime has greatly restricted access to these underground 
Internet portals, though any statistical evidence of netizens using such circumvention 
methods is inaccurate and unreliable.  
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Though censorship is imposed in a relatively blanket level across the country 
through the Great Firewall, the regime can exert tightened, specific restriction through 
manual censorship (Tai, 2012). King, et al. states that manual censorship, or the 
implementation of humans employed to actively read and filter posts by hand, is the most 
demanding form of social media regulation, as the media landscape in China is 
fragmented across hundreds of sites (2013). The same source asserts that these regulating 
bodies include tens of thousands of Internet police and Internet monitors, as well as 
around 250,000 patrolling party members. In this censorship mechanism, objectionable 
posts—which often include but are not limited to comments regarding government 
criticism, pornography, fraudulent activity, or complaints about social media censorship 
itself— can be manually deleted or accounts can be locked (McDonald, 2016). McDonald 
also writes that individuals may experience this type of censorship if a regulatory agent 
deems the content inappropriate or if it is reported as inappropriate by another user.  
In contrast to the comprehensive Great Firewall, rates of manual censorship vary 
across territory lines in China. For example, highly-populated provinces that boast many 
speakers, scholars, and singers, such as Xizang and Qinghai, are more likely to face 
greater Internet monitor censorship to “curtail private resistance” (Tai, 2012, p. 113). 
Consequently, McDonald states that the Great Firewall is met with more resistance in 
urban areas (2016). The same source states that, in contrast, rural provinces like Sichuan 
and Shaanxi have lower post deletion rates due to lack of citizen access to technology and 
sparse populations, thus reducing the general population’s ability to freely transmit one- 
or two-way messages. Regardless of geographic location, manual censors delete or filter 
46 
posts quickly. A 2011 study by King et. al based on 1,382 Chinese websites reveals that 
posts considered undesirable by the regime were largely deleted within twenty-four hours 
of the original publication time, though some material lingered for a few days until 
deleted (2013).  
According to the same source, another type of social media regulation is keyword 
blocking, which prevents netizens from posting certain words or phrases that are 
considered taboo. Similar to content that may be subject to post deletions, the same 
author finds that examples of taboo topics include commentary on censors and 
government policies, as well as certain arrests, religious groups, scandals, and protests. 
However, King et al. states that users can utilize circumvention methods to evade this 
type of censorship by using satire, analogies, and metaphors to hint at the intended term 
or phrase (2013). The same source states that netizens may also substitute characters to 
convey an intended message by using homophones, which are characters that sound alike, 
or homographs, characters that look alike. 
Not only does the regime employ social media censorship through preventative 
measures like the Great Firewall, manual censorship through post deletions, and keyword 
blocking, but intermediary actors--the content service providers linking the regime and 
the netizens--are also charged to keep tabs on users by mandating basic user information. 
Since censorship is such a large task, “the regime relies more heavily on domestic 
companies to police their own content” and are then held accountable for what takes 
place on their own platforms (MacKinnon, 2008, p. 42). When intermediary agents 
comply with the censorship guidelines set by the regime, there are a few regulatory tools 
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that are consistent across most bodies. For example, Han states that many content 
providers provide contact information to authorities, keep user data available for broad 
uses at the regime’s discretion, surveil online content to prevent objectionable expression, 
utilize pre-screening technology to filter netizens’ posts, and join forces with reputable 
local universities to lower chances of violations on their sites (2018).  
Many intermediary agents will create site-specific regulations that enforce state 
policies, such as employing “their own 24-hour cybermanagers to enforce the official 
rules to varying degrees” (Tai, 2012, p. 101). King et al. finds that Internet service 
providers often employ up to 1,000 proactive online censors per website to best ensure 
that the outlet is operating within the regime’s guidelines (2012). Tai furthermore states 
this movement quickly caught on across the Internet industry, ultimately creating 
associations of Internet service providers that band together to pledge their self-discipline 
in accordance with the regime, which began with corporations as early as 1997 (2012).  
However, some intermediary actors face censorship with resistance. In order to 
enforce federally mandated censorship while attempting to meet the needs of netizens, 
Han finds that some bodies delay censorship or promote debatable discussions on their 
platforms to resist government Internet regulation (2018). Touching again on Han’s 
theory of discontent compliance, intermediary agents must find a balance between the 
demands from the state and from netizens in order for individual platforms to survive 
(2018).  
Because social media can pave the way for groupthink and mobilization, the 
government also joins the Internet in various immersive measures in attempt to control 
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the flow of online information. Though the following three methods are not inherently 
censorship measures, the state uses 1) governmental social media accounts, 2) the 
“fifty-cent army,” and 3) opinion leaders to evade the social media landscape and add 
pro-regime content to cyberspace.  
Han finds that the 1999 Government Online Project has led to the registration of 
almost 55,000 government websites that push state-sponsored content out to netizens 
(2018). Additionally, this source states that government bodies quickly adapted to the rise 
of social media and have created over 164,000 verified government social pages on 
Weibo alone. Furthermore, common scholarship asserts that state agencies may publish 
social media that diverts netizens away from questioning internal issues in China or from 
expression undesirable emotion online. The regime thus immerses itself into the social 
media landscape in attempt to shape public opinion in favor of the state’s policies and 
administration. 
Perhaps the most widely known state immersion of the Internet outside of 
censorship is called the “fifty-cent army” of Internet communicators. The fifty-cent army 
is largely based off of the Chinese public relations tactic called “astroturfing,” in which 
actors who are “(often paid) to display apparent grassroots support for a product, policy, 
or event to shore up wider and more genuine support” (Han, 2018, p. 107). Using this 
mindset, individual members of the fifty-cent army can create multiple accounts to 
generate conversation on a topic of choice and shape it in a particular direction. Such 
individuals are employed to talk like regular Internet users, link government statistics and 
websites, support members of leadership, and even fabricate political information. 
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Though there is limited information on these bodies for obvious reasons, it is rumored 
that the name comes from their initial pay of fifty cents per post (Han, 2018).  
This author claims, however, that the fifty-cent army is more useful in pleasing 
central state leadership than engaging and conniving netizens to adhere to their 
viewpoints for various reasons. For example, these Internet communicators often lack 
incentive because they are poorly rewarded for posts, so their work is often ineffectively 
done. Additionally, in recent years it has become easier to detect the fifty-cent army’s 
posts by using metadata. These posts often come in bursts from the same geographic 
location and are repetitive in content. Due to lack of incentive, these paid Internet 
communicators hardly engage in critical discussions and generally post short, blatant 
assertions praising the regime. 
The third immersive measure the regime uses to shape the social media landscape 
is targeting opinion leaders of microblogs, whom netizens perceive to be credible. The 
regime’s attempts to harness the potential of microbloggers because public debates, 
critical opinions, and social analysis have “weakened the influence of the party media in 
setting the news agenda” (Li,  2015, p. 18). According to Li, ways in which the 
government influences these leaders include analyzing their numbers of followers, their 
attitude to protecting state interests, their ability to promote Chinese ideology and culture, 
their initiative in following state policies, and their implementation of reputable personal 
rights. Public opinion leaders meeting these qualifications are encouraged to promote 
party endeavors and to post information favorable of the regime on microblogs in an 
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effort to fulfill President Xi Jinping’s “long-term mission” of “guiding public opinion” 
(Li, 2015, p. 19).  
Though the Great Firewall, post deletions, and account lockouts certainly deter 
netizens from spreading messages, self-censorship is often personally implemented 
among Chinese netizens. Ying states that self-censorship occurs when individuals or 
organizations choose to consciously follow Internet regulation guidelines that are 
promulgated by the regime (2012). Tai asserts that the magnitude of censorship 
mechanisms primarily exists to enforce this notion of self-regulation among netizens, not 
to block ideas or criticisms (2012). Whether Internet users are hoping not to cause 
disruption with the state or if they are simply weary of upsetting friends and family with 
their opinions, many netizens—especially in rural areas—believe it is better to leave 
sensitive or objectionable content off of social media (McDonald, 2016).  
If netizens or organizations do not adhere to censorship guidelines, “different 
kinds of expression have different values or prices,” meaning that terms for validating 
censorship are largely subjective to the platform and to the regime’s discretion (Ying, 
2012, p. 77). For example, the 2013 Seven Bottom Line Policy holds that microbloggers, 
who have the most freedom to post inaccurate information based on the layout of the 
platform, could face “up to three to five years in prison if the posting is viewed more than 
5,000 times or retweeted 500 times” (Li, 2015, p. 17).  According to Freedom House 
(2018), general penalties for violating the regime’s guidelines on the Internet or in 
physical assembly may include formal punishment, such as fines or incarceration, or 
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consequences that are less formal and even harder to track, like harassment or 
intimidation. 
Because processes regarding the Great Firewall and censorship in general are 
largely withheld from the public, it is difficult for scholars to estimate the costs of 
censorship in China. Regarding the Great Firewall alone, however, cost projections for its 
creation and implementation begin around the equivalence of $60 million and shoot 
upward by hundreds of millions of dollars (The art, 2013). On a broader scale, Internet 
censorship falls under national concern for public security, which receives a 
comprehensive budget for all levels of government to maintain stability within society. 
According to the ​Nikkei Asian Review, ​in 2018 the expenditure for the sector of public 
security was 1.24 trillion yuan, or around $193 billion, up from 769 billion yuan in 2014. 
This surpasses China’s expenditure for national defense by an estimated 19%, a record 
high gap. Therefore, it can be concluded that the regime places significant value in 
censoring Internet content and social media effectively, which creates notable effects. 
Though it is true that the regime is able to adapt well in the midst of an expanding 
cyberspace, there are a number of challenges the Internet and its censorship brings to the 
government. For example, Han asserts that the inevitable differences in agendas and 
goals across fragmented regulatory authorities can ultimately lead to counterproductivity 
and inefficiencies in execution (2018). Similarly, just as the government disperses 
regulation across central, provincial, and local apparatuses, so the use of the Internet has 
become fragmented across individual websites and netizens. This pluralization of the 
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Internet has resulted in the emergence of dissident groups of Chinese netizens, who can 
speak out against the regime or promote their personal agendas online.  
By providing opportunities for citizens to connect and mobilize themselves, the 
Internet inevitably opens the door for expression that is unwelcomed by the regime. 
Despite attempts to curtail free expression, dissent does still exist in various forms of 
communication that could pose challenges for the regime. For example, Tai finds that 
individual netizens can send mass emails to fellow dissidents and post on online bulletin 
boards that offer more private conversation, rather than taking to the censored social 
media giants like WeChat, QQ, or Weibo (2012). Additionally, large-scale movements to 
advocate for the freedom of expression, democracy, and liberalization, such as the 
Tiananmen Square and Falun Gong demonstrations in the late 1990s, have connected 
thousands of dissidents across the country in effort to directly challenge the regime. 
Though governmental regulations control undesirable content in cyberspace, the Internet 
nevertheless facilitates conversations among netizens that could effectively challenge the 
regime.  
Often stemming from these dissident groups, the increased awareness of the 
government’s more immersive censorship tactics decreases netizens’ trust of the regime’s 
leadership, propaganda, and ideology, according to Han (2018). For example, creating 
inauthentic posts through the fifty-cent army and encouraging opinion leaders to espouse 
prescribed viewpoints actually skews citizen feedback, which limits governmental 
response to citizens’ interests and slows potential adjustments to policy. As censorship 
results in weakening political trust and social cohesion, Han argues that China’s 
53 
censorship of netizen expression has actually delegitimized the regime, rather than 
maintained its authoritarian power (2018).  
Impacts of the party’s censorship do not stop within the borders of China. The 
United States of America classified the regime’s extensive censorship as a barrier to trade 
in 2013 since many of the most globally used platforms were blocked, causing businesses 
to experience negative consequences due to restriction from engaging in many of China’s 
online markets (Mozur, 2016). For example, government agencies are attempting to ban 
sales of the Apple iPhone in China, and restricting cellular sales from the largest 
smartphone market in the world would nonetheless take a toll on this monumental foreign 
industry in particular. Even though China has banned access to many foreign platforms, 
China’s own e-commerce is booming. Domestic companies such as Alibaba and Baidu, 
China’s version of Google, have become some of the largest international organizations 
on the Web, which repeats the theme of successful internal social media platforms in the 
country.  
The examination of the country’s censorship apparatuses demonstrates that 
Chinese Internet users certainly have the ability to express their opinions and ideas on 
acceptable social platforms through legal rights guaranteed by the constitution. However, 
the Chinese government openly acknowledges that repercussions are likely to ensure if 
netizens’ expression strays from the parameters of decent content laid out by the regime. 
In reality, some of the repercussions of China’s Internet censorship can present 
challenges to the regime itself, such as the possibility of generating dissident mobilization 
or the general distrust and opposition toward the government’s motives. Such a complex, 
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often strained relationship between netizens and the regime thus depends upon balancing 
personal expression with governmental order. The following section analyzes what 
comprises this balance and how it currently works for China. 
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PART FIVE: FINDING EQUILIBRIUM ON THE INTERNET 
This section describes viewpoints found in literature that attempt to answer why 
censorship has historically been able to exist in the past and whether or not it should 
continue in the future. 
Historical Perspectives 
Current scholarship poses diverse theories or reasonings behind the 
implementation of governmental Internet regulations. One paramount rationale for 
censorship holds that the Chinese regime expurgates certain material to maintain order 
and status quo within Chinese society in all spheres (King et al., 2013). Supported widely 
by current research, this broad theory asserts that the regime seeks to display itself in the 
most favorable light possible, which extends to its values, its policies, and its history. 
Potential examples of what content might be censored under this theory include 
vulgarities and pornography, which are censored at a continuously high rate (King, et al., 
2013). Whether pornography exists in its inherent form, is disguised by news, or is 
mentioned in online literature, the regime typically censors this content at a rate that is 
almost proportional to the amount that is posted; for example, if ten articles of content 
involving pornography are uploaded, nearly eight of them would be removed, and if 
56 
fifteen similar articles were uploaded in February, nearly thirteen of them would be 
removed, as was the case in 2011 (King, et al. 2013). Since pornography, obscenity, and 
vulgarity do not reflect the societal order the Chinese regime desires to perpetuate, much 
of this content is censored under this theory. 
A second hypothesis serving as justification and rationale for China’s 
authoritarian censorship is termed the state critique theory. Essentially on the flip side of 
the same coin as the previous theory, the state critique assertion maintains that the party 
attempts to quash dissent and to refute thoughts and ideas that are not in accordance with 
the regime, its policies, and its leaders. Rather than removing content that simply does 
not mesh with society’s values, as in the previous theory, this theory holds that content of 
condemnatory nature is often filtered. This theory is thus a mechanism used to sustain the 
stability of the regime by removing threatening content and ultimately making “the sum 
total of available public expression more favorable to those in power” (King, et al., 2013, 
p. 2). Examples of potentially censored content include negative assessments of party 
leaders, policy implications, or, most importantly, criticisms of the human censors sorting 
through Internet content. A study by the ​American Political Science Review ​demonstrates 
that criticism of censors, such as content mentioning throwing shoes at Fang Binxing, 
Baidu copyright issues, and platforms being hacked, are subject to a relatively high 
censorship magnitude (King, et al., 2013). Consequently, the deletion of and blockades 
from certain content leaves the Internet with commentary that is largely in favor of the 
regime. Similarly, Li suggests that the state desires to create a “monopoly on 
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information” that grows in direct proportion to the Internet, which is achieved through 
some of the most sophisticated censorship mechanisms in the world (Li, 2015, p. 15).  
On the other hand, the collective action potential theory from the same authors 
posits that censorship is likely to occur when netizens utilize social media to 
communicate and generate mass action based on motivations other than those supported 
by the government, which may lead to political opposition or societal disruption that 
could challenge the authoritarian government (King et al., 2013). Social media in China 
has proven to shape and reconfigure netizens’ daily experiences and interactions, 
including collective action, which the authors describe as “an indicator of social and 
political change” (Zhao & Liu, 2015, p. 41). King et al. continues to assert that these 
theories sometimes work hand-in-hand, in that political opposition through collective 
action is often spurred by posting critiques of the state (2013). This trend results in a 
circular relationship in which the regime’s reasoning behind post deletions or content 
blocking can be multifaceted. However, the authors of this study argue that the regime 
primarily censors to prevent content with collective action material, which tends to face 
higher censorship rates than state criticism. Because this hypothesis is more specific than 
the previous theory and is substantially more supported by quantitative research than the 
second, many scholars support this premises behind the collective action potential theory. 
The collective action theory may include netizens using language that verbally 
support or even pave the way toward group formation in events, advocacy, or protests, in 
which the latter “is often thought to be the death knell of authoritarian regimes” (King et 
al., 2013). Though relatively small protests are acceptable and even welcome in China, 
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expression regarding large-scale protests that are not motivated by the state can become 
highly censored. For example, speech on social media concerning protests in Inner 
Mongolia, the Zengcheng protests, the pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square, and 
the independence protests in Tibet and Taiwan hold some of the highest censorship in the 
history of Internet in China (King et al., 2013). 
In complete contrast to the previous three theories, other scholarship holds that 
mainstream studies overlook the benefits censorship brings to Chinese society. According 
to Ying (2012), censorship brings productivity, collectivity, and nobility by linking 
individuals to networks through discourse and acceptable Internet content. The author 
states that censorship was traditionally defined as “direct forms of political intervention 
mostly by the state” that act in response to the growing knowledge of netizens (Ying, 
2012, p. 68). As today’s social media platforms expand and develop, however, censorship 
has become less direct and more fragmented, operating on a beneficial case-by-case 
basis, in which some content on a particular topic may be allowed and other content may 
not. According to Ying, the notion of state censorship can contemporarily be considered 
an effect of rising power from Chinese citizens, rather than a holistic means of imposing 
impermeable power over the people.  
Just as scholarship provides various methodologies behind the existence of 
censorship, so modern theories also present diverging viewpoints on the basis of its 
continuance for future generations. Authors who cannot justify the future of content 
regulation often base their arguments on the deprivation of human rights and the 
developmental limitations upon society that censorship bestows. In contrast to the 
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viewpoints in these articles, some literature supports the future of governmental 
censorship based on its ability to protect young or other vulnerable populations from 
exposure to sensitive content. The remainder of this section will be devoted to examining 
examples of these arguments. 
Future Perspectives 
Chinese artist Ai Weiwei writes in ​The New York Times ​that “censorship in China 
places limits on knowledge and values, which is the key to imposing ideological slavery” 
upon Chinese citizens (Weiwei, 2017, para. 19). As victims of this slavery, he asserts that 
Internet users receive information that is cherry-picked and force-fed by the state, thus 
robbing individuals of their ability to intellectually and naturally think for themselves. To 
this violation of human rights, the author posits that many Chinese netizens often “feign 
ignorance and speak in ambiguities,” opting to passively self-censor their own content, 
silence their personal opinions, and willingly become inferior to the regime (Weiwei, 
2017, para. 2). According to the author, this mindset of surrender that is so encouraged by 
the government eliminates Chinese netizens’ ability to choose independence and 
happiness in life. Because censorship directly violates the basic rights of humans, this 
author hopes for a future without expression of regulation (Weiwei, 2017, para. 20).  
Not only do some think that censorship should not be prolonged because it 
infringes upon netizens’ basic human rights, but other authors believe the idea behind 
content regulation hinders social development. According to Tkacheva, Schwartz, 
Libicki, Taylor, Martini, & Baxter, attempting to confine a limitless arena like cyberspace 
does not work to provide an optimal society (2013). The basic functions of the Internet 
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are designed to empower people through instantaneous communication and the exchange 
of ideas, “which are antithetical to regimes that seek to manage and control political 
discourse” and powerful social mobilization (Tkacheva et. al, 2013, p. 203). Thus, by 
stimulating the expansion of the cyberspace but creating virtual parameters within which 
users must operate, the authors would argue that the Chinese regime is “[struggling] 
against the underlying nature of the Internet itself” and limiting its own societal 
development (Tkacheva et. al, 2013, p. 203). Because of this multifaceted, juxtapositional 
relationship, Tkacheva et. al writes that censorship has potentially detrimental effects on 
the Chinese authoritarian regime itself, such as the willingness of netizens to “hide their 
true attitudes out of fear of retribution” online, that could possibly be resolved through 
release of technological restrictions and a gradual acceptance of increased Internet 
freedom (2013, p. 209). Despite the international push for free expression in China, 
however, the authors recognize that censorship of online information has become almost 
characteristic of authoritarian regimes and is likely to define China’s cyberspace in days 
to come.  
In contrast to these anti-censorship viewpoints, other scholarship holds that 
censorship is an integral part of China’s future because it protects some of the country’s 
defenseless or naive citizens from interacting with inappropriate or fake content. For 
example, some scholars believe that the availability of pornographic or violent content on 
the web would lead to the destruction of the children who witness it, as well as a potential 
rise in sex crimes due to predators luring in children through websites. Xin Li writes that 
these younger, less mature populations “do not have strong judgement to [distinguish] 
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good or bad, so they are easily influenced to follow improper activities from online 
sources” and potentially repeat the offenses they observe through screens (2013, p. 4). In 
addition to protecting children, the author also asserts that censorship is necessary in 
order to protect China’s more vulnerable, less informed citizens from fake information 
planted by terrorists. Though the regime does not guarantee the complete restriction of all 
sensitive material on the Internet, the author believes that “society would be more 
terrifying without censorship” (Li 2013, p. 5). As a result of these potential dangers from 
a borderless cyberspace, the author believes China’s limitation of malicious content is 
justified and recommends that other governments follow suit if the web is ever used to 
impede society.  
While literature on social media and Internet censorship in China is rather limited, 
many diverse viewpoints on its causes and its justification for the future exist. Many 
common theories of censorship methodology stem from the government’s desire to 
maintain supremacy over Chinese netizens; for example, the previously mentioned 
theories focus on the needs of upholding the national status quo, sifting out dissent from 
the public, and filtering content with collective action potential. However, an opposing, 
less common theory behind content regulation holds that censorship is a practice that has 
always been accepted in China because its benefits outweigh its consequences. Current 
scholarship also offers different stances regarding whether or not censorship should 
continue in China’s future, with opponents saying it degrades human rights and stunts the 
growth of society, and proponents asserting that it rightfully protects citizens from 
inappropriate or false information. Combining this literature review with the proceeding 
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information in this section, this comprehensive part serves as a presentation of the 
equilibrium argument.  
Primary Research on Internet Equilibrium Today 
Today’s forms of online expression in China are contingent upon the cooperation 
of the both the state and the people. For example, if the state wanted to quash all criticism 
of party leaders and every protest of policies, the authoritarian regime could justify doing 
so through its technological advancements and fragmented censorship mechanisms across 
all levels of government. Likewise, if citizens of China desired to completely rebel 
against the regulatory apparatuses on social media by flooding the web with sensitive 
content or allusions to forbidden words and phrases, netizens have the means of 
attempting to make these actions a reality. However, neither of these circumstances have 
occurred because the regime and netizens have struck a balance that renders censorship 
largely advantageous for society, in which netizens are willing to trade the drawbacks of 
content removal to protect what is prosperous. The current balance thus lies in the 
historical context of censorship and the relatively supportive viewpoints of netizens. In 
order to further explain this equilibrium, this section will describe how the regime has 
implemented censorship over time and how Chinese netizens currently respond. 
Regime  
In order to explore China’s social media and Internet landscape, it is essential to 
first understand the broader culture and environment in which the country operates. 
Though there is little scholarship stemming from China on this topic, recognized 
international scholarship often rebukes Chinese censorship when comparing its 
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boundaries on free expression to those existing in other countries. Two recent studies, 
compiled by Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders respectively, highlight the 
detriments of censorship by lowly ranking Chinese citizens’ political and civil liberties, 
as well as freedom of expression. Freedom House posits that, though China has 
historically monitored Internet content, President Xi Jinping’s claim of the office in 2012 
led to tightened regulation, restricted social movements, and inhibited flow of expression 
on social media platforms (2018). Similarly, the World Press Freedom Index by 
Reporters Without Borders asserts that the president has increasingly enforced policies 
that utilize China’s encompassing technology to censor and control the flow of 
information through printed and mobile news, thus restricting the state’s unencumbered 
expression  (2018). 
To explore the complex interpersonal climates in China, Freedom House first 
examines the state’s governing processes, finding that Chinese citizens have little to no 
political rights in modern society. For example, the current head of the government and 
national legislative representatives were not elected through free and fair elections; 
rather, elections are continuously left to the discretion and investigation of the Chinese 
Communist Party leadership, and candidates with necessary prerequisites are often 
bribed, coerced, or forced off the ballot. Similarly, dissenting individuals or groups who 
desire to organize different political parties, or more drastically, to overthrow China’s 
one-party system, may be silenced or punished with incarceration.  
As power is increasingly consolidated in the hands of prominent party leaders, 
Chinese citizens and independent media have the ability to express their curiosities 
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regarding the validity of the regime’s control according to the nation’s Constitution; 
however, the state’s feedback and reactions are infrequently transparent. For example, 
party officials have recently resisted to disclosing budgets at federal, provincial, and local 
levels and have incarcerated citizens joining in collective action to challenge the regime’s 
ambiguity. Moreover, individuals theoretically have the ability to question and even 
speak out against the regime, but those who choose this course of action should be 
prepared to face potential consequences or punishments. 
Individuals and groups additionally face limitations in their ability to relocate 
their homes abroad or to other areas of the country and to gather in strikes and protests. 
Though these actions are lawfully permitted, many assemblies, especially those 
motivated by forces other than the government, realistically do not occur without 
government approval. Not only can Chinese regulations hinder citizens from relocating, 
but censorship in China has also prevented foreign individuals and organizations from 
spreading messages in the mainland. Violating the status quo of regulation often results in 
consequences; for example, Reporters Without Borders’ summary of China’s Internet 
regulation mentions individuals detained for making objectionable comments or sharing 
dissidents’ posts that may be undesirable to the regime (2018). As China’s online 
presence grows through both mobile news outlets and social media platforms, the study 
cites that more than 50 journalists and bloggers are currently living in uninhabitable 
conditions for defying the regime’s regulatory rules.  
Reporters Without Borders takes these factors into account when calculating the 
World Press Freedom Index to rank each country’s freedom of expression, which also 
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assesses pluralism of opinions in media, independence of news and information outlets, 
self-censorship from netizens or from Internet service providers, existing legislation that 
restricts or encourages information-sharing, transparency of governing bodies and service 
providers, infrastructure involved in circulating information, and the level of abuses or 
violence. The indicators are scored individually and are entered into formulas that 
produce grades ranging from zero to 100, with 100 being the worst. China’s score for 
2018 is 78.29, which is an increase of 0.63 points from the previous year. Out of the 180 
countries studied by Reporters Without Borders, 20 nations are categorized as “very 
bad,” including China, which ranks 176 out 180. Similarly, the OpenNet Initiative 
classified the regime’s censorship as “pervasive” in political spheres and “substantial” 
regarding social language (MacKinnon, 2008, p. 37).  
From these comprehensive studies it is can be determined that the authoritarian 
regime’s policies expand past the parameters of cyberspace and contribute to the greater 
restrictive social and political climates spanning China’s borders. This trend has existed 
long before the inception of today’s People’s Republic of China, in which various forms 
of regulatory apparatuses have extensively limited the freedom of expression in 
comparison to the rest of the world, even as Internet access in China expands. As social 
media has gained momentum in the country within the last couple of decades, different 
methods of censorship have evolved in order to keep up with the constant flow of online 
information and expression.  
In contrast to these viewpoints, Ying posits that the Chinese largely do not abhor 
censorship today because it is not new to China, dating back thousands of years prior to 
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the current regime when multiple dynasties fought to build an encompassing empire 
(2012). Of these Warring States was the “barbarous,” dominant Qin dynasty, from which 
then-prince Ying Zheng arose and proclaimed himself the First Emperor of Qin, or Qin 
Shi Huang, in the mid-250s BC (Fang, 2015, p. 54). In the year 213 BC, Qin Shi Huang 
spearheaded what is now widely known as the first recorded censorship mechanism in 
Chinese history, in which hand-written accounts, such as books and historical records, 
before his reign were burned “to make the common people ignorant and to see to it that 
no one in the empire used the past to criticize the present” (Fang, 2015, p. 55). In addition 
to Qin Shi Huang’s book-burning escapade, which prevented unacceptable or sensitive 
knowledge from spreading to ordinary citizens, he viciously silenced and punished 
scholars who voiced or demonstrated dissent against his reign or policies. To this end, the 
First Emperor buried alive hundreds of Confucian scholars who voiced criticism against 
his rule--or whom he assumed could potentially voice criticism--in another well-known 
campaign. Though these actions are now widely perceived as some “of the most 
pernicious and hated acts in all of Chinese history” and evidence of their occurrences is 
almost nonexistent, these early acts of censorship began the trend of monitoring the 
circulation of information that is prevalent within China’s past and present (Fang, 2015 p. 
55). 
In order to stimulate his authority and credibility, Qin Shi Huang also flooded 
primitive methods of communication with his own praises. With the workings of scholars 
and accounts of history now burned, he was free to rewrite history in ways that glorified 
his legitimacy as a ruler, which consisted of stories that were often fabricated. For 
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example, Qin Shi Huang ordered testaments of his accomplishments, abilities, and 
aspirations, such as his strong descendancy and his tales of conquest, to be inscribed on 
mountain ridges for all to read (Fang, 2015). To effectively disseminate these claims and 
his political orders, he created the first consistent form of writing that removed an 
estimated 25% of existing characters and served to “counter all diversity, [eliminate] 
obsolete and offensive characters, [simplify] others and [standardize] each and every 
one” (Fang, 2015, p. 57). This comprehensive, government-mandated language 
reinforced the empire’s authority as it “erased the last excuse for misunderstanding or 
misinterpreting the law” (Fang, 2015, p. 57).  
While Qin Shi Huang’s mandates were rather extreme, this mindset of controlling 
content with the potential for circulation remained prevalent among Chinese leaders well 
into the Song Dynasty, which ascended to power in the year 960 AD (Ying, 2012). When 
movable type was invented in the 1040s during the Song reign, literature and expression 
flourished at exponential rates, to which leaders began to implement rudimentary 
censorship mechanisms that guided and limited their publication and circulation. These 
early regulations were “designed simply for the government’s benefit” and ultimately 
provided the inspiration for censorship policy in the dynasties to come based on the ideas 
of protecting the state’s interests in sharing information and enforcing state security 
through surveillance (Ying, 2012, p. 65). These policies were later expanded, notably in 
the Qing Dynasty beginning in 1644, in which the increasing ability for printing to 
connect people was viewed as “potentially subversive and to be feared” (Ying, 2012, p. 
65). Resulting from this growing opinion, more books were banned, specific words were 
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prohibited, and scholars--and sometimes their families--were killed for publishing 
undesirable content that may have contained as much as one offensive word.  
Nearly 300 years later, the Nationalist Party attempted to gain total control over 
individual and group expression. Though this group wanted the public to think they 
would receive democratic civil liberties, such as freedom of publication, that were 
promised by the previously-overthrown revolution led by Sun Yat-sen, the Nationalist 
Party actually enforced greater regulatory laws (Ying, 2012). In reality, the party 
suppressed political opposition and created the requirement for content providers to 
register with the state. Still later, when the People’s Republic of China was established in 
1949 under the leadership of a communist regime, Mao Zedong’s government almost 
completely controlled the daily actions of Chinese individuals, groups, organizations and 
businesses “disguised by nationalism and Mao’s mythic image” (Ying, 2012, p. 66).  
Today, it is often said in international scholarship that President Xi Jinping is 
increasing regulations to make the Great Firewall taller than ever before. The current 
regime has expanded its censorship apparatus in a number of ways; for example, the 
leadership is creating technological advancements through which social media can be 
better monitored, private information can be easily accessed, and online communication 
can be frequently observed (Forbidden, 2018, p. 4). The regime has also legally expanded 
the regulatory policies that define modern communication, thereby giving leaders a 
broader scope in which to operate. Lastly, the president is attempting to garner 
ideological support for cyber sovereignty, a national viewpoint positing that it is the 
“state’s sovereign right to shape and control the online space within its borders, including 
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through its own determination of what constitutes harmful or unwelcome speech” 
(Forbidden, 2018, p. 17). This framework would justify the concepts behind centralized 
censorship into almost every sector netizens’ daily lives, which is already being seen with 
the rise of social media platforms. However, as a result of China’s long, developing 
history with censorship and content regulation, Ying argues that the majority of Chinese 
citizens do not challenge the social media surveillance that occurs today (2012).  
Censorship has always existed in order to paint a positive picture of the regime. 
Since the most rudimentary forms of censorship, however, the methodologies of 
publication surveillance have become less drastic. For example, there has been a shift 
from holistically destroying forms of expression to creating today’s blockades or partial 
filters of content that can still be accessed through purchasing virtual private networks or 
using various circumvention methods. Therefore, undesirable content certainly may be 
difficult to access, but it is not completely gone forever, as in centuries past. Rather than 
existing purely to withhold information from citizens, today’s fragmentation of 
censorship is likely in response to the growing power and capability of netizens to 
generate reformative conversations. Though methods of censorship are diversifying due 
to the expansion of the Internet, content regulation is nothing new to the Chinese, who 
have experienced some forms of censorship since the first unifying governmental 
presence in China thousands of years ago.  
Netizens 
Since social media censorship in China is a potentially sensitive topic, existing 
research and theories based on the firsthand opinions of Chinese citizens on different 
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facets of this subject is rather limited. In attempt to investigate and understand the 
attitudes and viewpoints of Chinese citizens on the state’s censorship apparatuses, a brief 
survey consisting of various qualitative and quantitative questions was created and 
executed by the author of this thesis. Consequently and most importantly, this survey was 
created to contribute research to the field directly from Chinese netizens, rather than from 
the regime or from international scholars.  
Methodology 
The survey was administered in two separate environments. In the first session, 
eight students enrolled in a college in Beijing, The People’s Republic of China’s capital 
city with population of roughly 21.5 million, were visiting the University of Mississippi 
for two weeks as participants of an educational program, and they had the option to fill 
out the printed surveys by hand. These eight surveys were administered in a classroom 
setting on the University of Mississippi campus in the presence of an instructor on 
January 18, 2019. Though every student could speak and write in English, the questions 
were individually read aloud by the author of this thesis to best ensure effective 
communication. The author remained present before, during, and after the entire survey 
session to answer any questions, such as term clarification or topical inquiries about the 
research in general. Each participant had his or her own printed survey and returned it to 
the author upon completion, which took around 30 minutes on average.  
In the second session, the author emailed the survey to a Chinese student seeking 
an undergraduate degree at the University of Mississippi on January 24, 2019. The 
student volunteered to share the survey with other Chinese students in Oxford, a college 
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town in North Mississippi with a population of nearly 24,000. Each student is seeking a 
degree at the University of Mississippi and has been enrolled in the institution for at least 
one semester. Because the author could not be physically present for these eight online 
surveys, the author placed an emphasis on utilizing her provided phone number and email 
address should the participants have any questions about their responses or the research 
in general. By January 29, 2019, the student had responded with eight voluntary surveys 
that were completed by Chinese students at the University of Mississippi. 
The untimed survey, consisting of fifteen questions, was approved by the 
University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board and was completed by sixteen 
total Chinese students. An informational cover sheet outlined the details of the survey, 
and the contents of the document are summarized in this paragraph. The students were 
assured a high degree of confidentiality, in which only their ages would be recorded, and 
any other identifying information, such as their personal names, genders, or the names of 
their universities, would be omitted due to the potential sensitivity of the subject matter. 
Because of the students’ anonymity, no financial, economic, or personal risks for taking 
the survey were foreseeable. No form of compensation was granted for taking this 
survey. Furthermore, each student was made aware of his or her right to skip questions 
and the freedom to withdraw from the survey at any time, which no student did. 
The survey is comprised of two sections that were designed to determine the 
opinions, experiences, behaviors, and preferences of Chinese netizens regarding social 
media and censorship. As previously mentioned, participants were only asked to provide 
their ages, and no other identifying information was recorded. The following six 
72 
questions were open-ended and qualitative, which allowed participants to freely write or 
type their own responses based on individual perceptions, emotions, and viewpoints. In 
this section, respondents were asked to describe their viewpoints on censorship and 
explain their interactions with social media. The latter nine questions allowed participants 
to express their responses through comparable quantitative methods, such as selecting a 
number on a Likert scale, choosing a letter in multiple choice, or selecting numerous 
options that might apply to them. By answering the final questions, participants analyzed 
the impacts censorship has on themselves as private individuals and their surrounding 
society. The complete list of interview questions is included in Appendix I.  
Though this study provides insight into the ways in which Chinese netizens view 
social media censorship, various weaknesses of the survey must be highlighted in order to 
provide a transparent analysis of data. The survey is first limited due to the small sample 
size of survey participants, as sixteen individuals may not accurately provide a holistic 
representation of hundreds of millions of Chinese netizens. The survey is also limited in 
that the sixteen participants are fairly young, with the vast majority of respondents’ ages 
ranging from nineteen to twenty-two years old, and the two outlier ages, twenty-six and 
twenty-nine, could still provide rather youthful perspectives on the topic. In addition to 
their shared youth, the participants in this survey are all educated members of society 
with the individual abilities to participate in postsecondary scholarship programs at 
accredited universities. Since the basic demographics of this small population are 
relatively similar, viewpoints and responses from these individuals have the potential to 
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significantly differ from other Chinese netizens, such as older generations or less 
educated individuals.  
Despite the study’s apparent weaknesses, however, the results from this survey 
reveal viewpoints directly from netizens on a topic about which research is severely 
limited due to its potentially dangerous, sensitive nature. Therefore, this data can serve as 
a microcosm of the greater opinions on censorship that derive from the individuals who 
use social media most as revealed in the literature review: young, educated Chinese 
citizens. This group of people is so influential that the Chinese government views them as 
opinion leaders with expression to be harnessed, stemming from their unique ability to 
sway the stances, actions, and emotions of others purely through social media platforms. 
As a result of this group’s power on the Internet, responses from these sixteen young, 
educated individuals can offer critical insight on how the concept of censorship is 
currently received by netizens and what the future relationship between Internet users and 
censorship may look like as this prominent population grows older.  
In order to analyze the data from the sixteen surveys, each participant’s responses 
were recorded in a word processing document. The individual pieces of feedback were 
organized by question, with responses from the Chinese citizens who temporarily 
travelled to Mississippi grouped consecutively, immediately followed by the responses 
from the Chinese students enrolled at the University of Mississippi. Significant 
differences and common ties between responses were recorded in order to detect 
comprehensive themes across the primary research. 
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Analysis 
After describing the methodology behind the survey as well as its strengths and 
weaknesses, an analysis of the survey responses gathered from the sixteen Chinese 
netizens is provided. This analysis will first holistically analyze the data to reveal 
attitudes and viewpoints on social media censorship from the perspective of the young, 
educated members of Chinese society in general. However, this examination will also go 
a step further to intricately study responses from the students who permanently live in 
China as compared to those who are enrolled full-time at the University of Mississippi. 
This more specific analysis will highlight differences that might exist based on living 
within the regime’s jurisdiction and, conversely, living on the other side of the world in a 
nation where freedom of expression is highly defended. An overview of the survey 
results follows this introductory paragraph.  
The participants are active communicators, with eleven of the sixteen individuals 
reporting that they use more than one social media platform at least sometimes. Though 
there are a couple of outlier platforms, such as Douban and WhatsApp, each participant 
asserts that he or she mainly uses QQ, WeChat, Sina Weibo, or a combination of these 
three platforms in China. On these platforms, all sixteen of the survey participants are 
likely to utilize a common variety of functions, which includes sharing photos and 
videos, making payments, reading the news, posting status updates, sending voice 
recordings, creating microblogs, and connecting with friends, family, and strangers alike. 
However, the number of respondents who reportedly use social media for governmental 
purposes is staunchly lower than those who use it for general communication. For 
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example, five individuals say they use social media to discuss politics or current culture, 
five use it to engage in debates, four use it to follow government accounts, and three use 
it to contact government leadership. Regardless of the motives behind netizens’ social 
media usage, the Chinese government is prevalent across social media through its diverse 
regulatory apparatuses. 
When discussing the general topic of censorship in China, all sixteen individuals 
assert that content regulation certainly exists on current social media platforms. 
Respondents offer a wealth of reasons to support their assertions, such as netizens’ 
inability to access Facebook, Google, or Instagram in China, the evident trend of post 
deletions, the publishing restrictions for content providers, and the intensifying 
governmental inspection in response to the rapid growth of social media. The majority of 
the respondents furthermore believe that not only does censorship exist, but it rightfully 
should exist on social media. Thirteen individuals posit that censorship has many societal 
benefits, such as filtering out rumors and fake news, preventing national terror, 
prohibiting brainwashing, and protecting children from inappropriate content, that 
warrant its existence. However, three respondents assert that social media content should 
not be censored because its implementation disregards individual freedom and privacy.  
Participants were then asked their perceptions of the primary function of social 
media censorship within China’s borders, to which seven individuals answered that they 
were unaware of its purpose. On the opposite end of the spectrum, other individuals 
responded that censorship exists mainly to prevent negative or potentially hurtful 
information, such as content pertaining to terrorism, drugs, violence, or pornography, 
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from reaching citizens. Another viewpoint holds that censorship acts more in the state’s 
interest than that of the people. To this point, two participants answered that the social 
media censorship apparatus exists to uphold the goals of the state by promoting national 
unity and by protecting the communist ideology from foreign influence. 
Though just over half of the respondents could provide reasoning for the concept 
of content regulation, the participants allude that society is widely cognizant of 
censorship. Six individuals respond that censorship is often discussed in China, while 
seven report that it is sometimes a topic of conversation. Two participants say it is not 
often discussed, and one says it is never discussed. From this sample population, three 
individuals relay that they had various personal experiences with censorship, citing 
instances of inability to access Instagram and Twitter in China, as well as automatic post 
deletions and direct banning of content. Though thirteen individuals reported no history 
of personal censorship interactions, one of these participants mentioned that he or she 
knows content regulation is a reality for members of surrounding communities. Many of 
the respondents’ answers centered around these trends of censorship when asked about 
improvements they would like to see on Internet platforms.  
In response to this query, five participants gave answers alluding to a desire for 
less social media censorship. One of these respondents suggests the best improvement to 
social media would be less censorship verbatim, and two other participants mention that 
they wish information would not be controlled by influential formal leaders of the 
communist party. Similarly, another individual states that he or she wants the government 
to let netizens know the truth about certain topics, rather than censor information across 
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platforms that is deemed unfavorable to the regime. Such bureaucratic censorship of 
social media may skew content largely in support of the regime’s leadership and policies, 
which leads one participant to desire the preservation of authenticity and diversity of 
information, rather than a one-sided flow of opinions and conversations. In contrast to 
these responses, two individuals believe improvements to social media center around the 
enforcement of censorship. For example, one respondent believes the social media 
landscape would benefit from increased detection and deletion of accounts, while another 
participant wishes viewing and positing of sensitive information could be restricted by 
age level.  
While the previously discussed individuals believe improvements to social media 
stem from less censorship or the maintenance of censorship respectively, three 
participants respond that social media could benefit from the increased personal freedoms 
of netizens. For example, one respondent wishes for more freedom of speech, while the 
two others desire more personal reason, judgement, and fairness across platforms. In 
response to the same question, three other respondents believe the structure and 
operations of social media must improve to create more organized, efficient 
communications. The final three individuals offer vague improvements to social media, 
such as wishing for “lots” of changes or “more positive” content.  
Though every member of this netizen group acknowledges the existence of 
governmental censorship of social media, quantitative data reveals that individuals offer 
different viewpoints regarding its effects on posted content. Eight participants say that 
censorship imposes numerous changes on the information received across Internet 
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platforms, while four say there are no changes, and another four say there are only 
minimal changes to content. As a result of these perceived changes, individuals also view 
the reliability of information on social media differently. For example, ten individuals 
believe censorship makes social media content somewhat reliable, two say it is mostly 
reliable, two say it is mostly unreliable, one says it is reliable, and one says it is very 
unreliable. 
Because these individuals are all plugged into social media to perform a multitude 
of functions, the respondents have various viewpoints regarding online activism. Seven 
participants have a neutral attitude toward commenting about social media censorship on 
an online platform, while three say they are likely to make such a comment. On the 
opposite end of the spectrum, four people say they are not likely to comment on 
censorship, and two say the never would. When asked about the likelihood of voicing 
criticism about the regime on social media, six were neutral, while two were likely and 
another two were extremely likely to criticize the regime online. However, one individual 
reported to be unlikely to voice criticism, while five say they never would.  
The responses from these quantitative questions, as well as from the previous 
qualitative inquiries, culminate to shape the participants’ opinions toward China’s 
censorship of social media content. Six individuals are indifferent toward censorship, 
while three like and two strongly like the government’s regulatory apparatuses. In 
contrast to these opinions, four participants dislike and one strongly dislikes social media 
censorship. Consequently, the participants can loosely be grouped into thirds, in which 
79 
one group is indifferent toward social media censorship, one third generally dislikes it, 
and the other third generally likes it.  
While a general analysis of the survey results certainly reveals useful information 
regarding social media censorship, various themes emerge from a deeper comparison of 
the data from the Beijing students and the University of Mississippi students. For 
example, the two groups of Chinese individuals find common ground in that they largely 
perceive social media content to be somewhat reliable, which is likely partly due to their 
assertions that censorship imposes numerous changes upon what is posted online. 
Additionally, the participants would agree that the topic of social media censorship is 
occasionally discussed in China, rather than being completely taboo or, conversely, a 
common conversation starter.  
Similarities can also be detected when analyzing the social media platforms used 
by both groups of participants. For example, even though netizens of diverse 
backgrounds in America have the opportunity to create accounts on any Western Internet 
platform, such as Facebook or Twitter, the Chinese students seeking degrees at the 
University of Mississippi still predominantly utilize Chinese social media outlets over 
international platforms. The majority of respondents from both Beijing and Mississippi 
respond that they perform similar functions on these platforms, like sharing photos and 
videos, posting status updates, connecting with people they know, and making payments. 
However, though these functions can be completed on Western platforms, only one 
respondent mentions using Instagram at least sometimes. It can be concluded from this 
data that these Chinese netizens are looking for function, community, and 
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interconnectivity rather than the ability to access a specific platform that is restricted in 
China.  
Though valid similarities certainly exist between the respondents from Beijing 
and Mississippi, differences between the two groups are evident based on their respective 
cultural surroundings. For example, in the United States, the freedoms of speech and 
press have historically been supported by the people and have been upheld and reinforced 
by the courts in notable decisions like ​Yates v. United States ​and ​New York Times 
Company v. United States​. Perhaps this expressive culture is why the Chinese students 
enrolled at the University of Mississippi offer responses that symbolize such personal 
freedoms; for example, these students are more likely to discuss common culture, to 
engage in debates, to follow government accounts, to contact government leadership, and 
are less likely to desire to be anonymous on social media. 
Furthermore, the survey reveals that Chinese respondents from the University of 
Mississippi perceive the regime’s censorship to be more prevalent across the social media 
landscape than do the respondents from Beijing. Where seven out of eight University of 
Mississippi participants say censorship is common within China’s borders, five Beijing 
participants say it is occasional, two find it common, and one finds censorship extremely 
common within the nation’s cyberspace. Just as individuals from the University of 
Mississippi are more likely to put censorship on a larger national scale, so respondents 
from this state were more likely to provide a reason for the primary function of 
censorship, as previously discussed, whereas six of the Beijing participants gave answers 
such as “I don’t know,” “I am not familiar with it,” or “I have no idea.” 
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The Beijing participants’ responses generally reflect more support for censorship 
of sensitive and inappropriate content as compared to the Chinese students enrolled 
full-time at the University of Mississippi. Though three Beijing participants did respond 
that social media should not be censored due to lack of personal freedoms, there is a 
greater number of Beijing individuals who like or strongly like censorship than 
Mississippi students, as derived from the quantitative data. In addition, even though the 
majority of individuals from Beijing are neutral about publishing comments regarding 
social media censorship, they are less likely to voice criticism of the regime on social 
media than are the respondents attending school in Mississippi. Such loyalty to the 
regime from the Beijing netizens may correlate with the absence of any of these 
respondents revealing a personal experience with censorship.  
An analysis of these surveys offers insight into the trends, opinions, and 
viewpoints of young, educated Chinese netizens—the demographic that most often uses 
social media. From these results, it can be concluded that these Chinese netizens openly 
acknowledge the existence of China’s diverse censorship mechanisms on social media. 
Though certain platforms may be inaccessible and specific posts may be blocked, 
netizens are loyal to Chinese platforms that allow them to perform universal 
communication functions. Few respondents assert that social media should be less 
censored because individuals deserve to have their own freedoms of privacy and speech 
respected, not because Chinese netizens feel they are receiving inadequate information or 
incomplete access to the Internet. As a result of these trends, the surveyed netizens 
generally support the regime’s censorship apparatuses because they value the regime’s 
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efforts of preventing sensitive, inaccurate, or dangerous information from negatively 
impacting members of society and can still express their voices to their satisfaction on 
other platforms. 
From analyzing the regime’s historical approach to censorship and netizens’ 
responses to it, it is evident that censorship has become an almost integral part of society 
with which the majority of netizens have become accustomed. Because of the ways in 
which content regulation has immersed itself in the daily lives of Chinese citizens well 
before the People’s Republic of China was even established, it can be concluded that 
netizens are generally satisfied with or at least indifferent toward censorship’s filtrations 
of inappropriate content since it does offer some benefit toward society. To dig even 
deeper into this topic, an analysis is provided in the following section to shed light on the 
subject of whether or not censorship should exist in the years to come and the 
implications it may cause.  
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PART SIX: ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 
As one of the first countries to seriously invest in intensive Internet censorship 
mechanisms, China continues its centuries-long history of being a world leader on this 
front. Because content regulation has certainly brought various benefits to the state, such 
as previously discussed increased e-commerce, political cohesion, and social order, other 
countries may be inclined to follow in China’s footsteps and institute forms of regulatory 
apparatuses within their own borders. This concluding section will overview some 
reasons that the ideals behind censorship may potentially be adopted in other countries, as 
well as the implications content regulation may impose on these nations and China itself. 
Following this analysis, this section will discuss whether or not censorship presents a 
problem for Chinese society, in which the current balance between expression and order 
could waver in the future. Improvements and corrections to the regime’s current 
censorship apparatus will be provided in this section, as well as suggestions for future 
research on this multifaceted topic.  
Though Chinese censorship is often contested by mainstream scholarship, there 
are certain altruistic ideals behind content regulation that may be appealing to other 
countries, causing extensive regulation to potentially spread past China’s borders. One of 
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these ideals follows that the screening of unacceptable content prevents harmful 
information from negatively affecting citizens. For example, the ability to filter out false 
information of domestic or foreign descent could generally be beneficial for society, 
especially in response to the current international trend of fighting fake political news. 
Following this mindset, the removal of inaccurate or fraudulent claims from cyberspace 
would put greater focus on information that is actually reliable, thus likely creating a 
better-informed, more patriotic citizenry. Similarly, the sifting of Internet content could 
reduce national security risks by cracking down on cyberterrorism that spreads through 
viruses and malware. By filtering content that is deliberately intended to cause social 
panic, regulating bodies could play an important role in maintaining peace and cohesion 
if a disaster were rumored. In addition to preventing the spread of fake news and 
cyberterrorism, filtering online information could also protect younger populations from 
sensitive information, such as pornographic or violent material, that is almost completely 
accessible in countries without Internet borders. Moreover, the ideals behind censorship 
and partial screening of content may be adopted by other countries because it sends a 
strong message to both other nations and its own citizens regarding what the country will 
and will not tolerate.  
China and other countries that may choose to implement similar censorship 
apparatuses will have to face certain implications of content regulation, starting with 
discovering where to draw the line between the free flow of opinions and content control. 
For instance, other governments may elect to utilize censorship to filter only national 
security threats or sexual content, which seems at least somewhat altruistic, but they then 
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must decide where censorship should stop, if it should at all. Furthermore, the large-scale 
spread of censorship could result in a continuous wave of information filtration stemming 
from other authoritarian regimes that might even spread to dismantle democracies, or on 
the other hand, create tensions between countries with free flows of information. Such 
tensions could--and do currently--present themselves in the forms of barriers to trade, 
scholarship, and communication with the outside world. 
As a result of these implications from censorship, it is necessary to question 
whether or not the current balance between online expression and social order, as well as 
government superiority and human rights, in present-day China is problematic. Though 
the authoritarian regime may justify Internet censorship through its history entrenched 
with benefits it brings society, such as filtering out violent or pornographic content or 
creating domestic e-commerce sites and social media platforms that increase the nation’s 
ability to be self-serving, Chinese citizens are realistically living in information darkness, 
in which almost a billion users’ innate abilities to make objectively informed personal 
decisions are limited. The restraints placed on communication and research are 
unacceptable and detrimental to growth, as the largest and potentially most influential 
netizen base in the world is unaware of the breadth of information surrounding them and 
is blocked from entering a global conversation. The withdrawal of ideas, thoughts, news, 
and events from cyberspace, each with the unborn potential to advance and diversify 
Chinese society, is an issue because censorship provides netizens with only partial access 
to information, which cannot be considered the complete truth. As censorship tightens 
under the current leadership while Internet users increasingly desire the privacy and 
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freedom with which they can speak their minds, this separation from truth will likely 
cause a break in China’s current balance between netizens’ expression and governmental 
order. 
As a result of the foreseeable disruption to the current Internet equilibrium, it is 
logical to conclude that censorship should not be a part of Chinese society forever, 
responding to the influx of netizens who challenge the substantial communication and 
information standards set by the regime. To this end, covering up netizens who are brave 
enough to be vocal now will not last forever; in the years to come, they will likely begin 
demanding change in magnitudes that cannot be ignored or subdued. Just as censorship 
has holistically become less extreme with time, ranging from the complete destruction of 
books and records to today’s partial banning of content that can still be accessed on the 
web outside of the country’s borders, censorship should phase out, or at least become less 
extensive, as netizens become more outspoken and influential.  
Though extensive censorship should not be a permanent facet of Chinese society, 
the current balance between expression and order is likely to continue in the immediate 
future. This present-day equilibrium can be corrected and improved by genuinely 
listening to the voices of netizens, rather than blatantly silencing or hiding them, as it 
should never be ignored that many netizens do genuinely advocate for regulation while 
others oppose it. Returning to the primary survey feedback from the sixteen Chinese 
netizens, for example, many individuals support some ideals behind censorship but wish 
it could be scaled down to respect their personal freedoms, such as leaving private 
conversations private and giving users more reason and judgment to acquire diverse 
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information within their social media experiences. Netizens in this survey also suggest 
age level restrictions on potentially sensitive, graphic, or explicit information but support 
the wholesale deletion of fake accounts and fraudulent news articles. In general, however, 
as most Chinese netizens are aware of censorship and the ways in which it impacts their 
daily lives, the regime needs to increase the reliability of information Internet users 
receive. To this end, the government should increase discussion of social media and 
Internet censorship in China, not only clarifying what is acceptable to post or publish and 
what is not, but also thoroughly explaining and offering justification as to why content is 
being censored from reaching netizens.  
To build on the research and assertions presented in this thesis, succeeding 
scholarship should focus on further detecting the viewpoints of Chinese netizens and the 
regime toward the future of censorship on social media. Research stemming directly from 
Chinese netizens is the only way to determine their true attitudes on the topic because 
Western literature is likely going to be biased toward increasing the personal freedoms of 
expression, privacy, and human rights on the Internet. To further contribute to this field, a 
potential study of anonymous anecdotal evidence of netizens’ censorship experiences, 
ranging from the Great Firewall or individual post deletions, would be useful in 
determining their understanding of what happened and why they thought it happened. 
However, issues with conducting this research mainly center around censorship itself, 
which will likely block content of this nature from publication or very likely intimidate 
Chinese netizens from sharing their viewpoints in the first place.  
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Furthermore, research that implements feedback from the Chinese regime itself, 
such as interviews with members of the government on any level who can explain what 
happens when content is regulated and for what reason, would increase transparency and 
international comprehension on the topic of censorship. As in the case with netizens, 
however, the sensitivity of this topic may likely result in hesitancy or extreme opposition 
to participate in such a study. In general, since there is such limited existing literature in 
this field, any scholarship that shines light on a single facet of the content regulation 
apparatus would be useful in better understanding the relationship between Chinese 
netizens and social media censorship.  
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APPENDIX 
Interview Questions for Sixteen Chinese Netizens 
 
Age: _____  
 
Please answer questions #1-6 based on your own opinion and experiences. There is no 
right or wrong answer. 
 
1. Do you think there is social media censorship in China? Why or why not? 
2. Do you think social media should or should not be censored? Why or why not? 
3. What do you think is the primary function of social media censorship in China? 
4. Do you have a personal experiences with censorship on a social media platform? If so, 
what happened? 
5. What improvements would you like to see on social media platforms? 
6. Write any social media platforms that you use at least sometimes in China. 
 
Please answer survey questions #7-15. 
 
7. Which of the following functions do you perform on social media? Put “X” by 
multiple  
choices if needed. 
___ Share photos and/or videos 
___ Post status updates 
___ Send voice recordings 
___ Make payments 
___ Play games 
___ To be anonymous 
___ Connect with people you know 
___ Connect with people you do not know 
___ Create blogs/microblogs 
___ Read the news 
___ Engage in debates 
___ Discuss politics or current culture 
___ Contact government leadership 
___ Follow government accounts 
___ ​Other​ (please describe here):  
 
8. Rank the reliability of information you feel you receive on Chinese social media 
platforms. Please choose one answer. 
           1                     2        3    4       5 
Very unreliable      Mostly unreliable      Somewhat reliable     Mostly reliable      Reliable 
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9. How much, if any, do you believe that censorship changes the information you receive 
on social media? Please choose one answer. 
1. No changes 
2. Minimal changes 
3. Numerous changes 
4. Extreme changes 
10. How often are you exposed to international social media outlets in China (ex. 
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter)?  
1. Never 
2. Occasionally  
3. Often 
11. What is your opinion toward China’s censorship of social media? 
 
            1     2       3    4             5 
Strongly dislike          Dislike            Indifferent         Like       Strongly like 
 
12. How common is censorship across the Chinese social media landscape? 
 
           1     2       3    4             5 
    Nonexistent      Not common      Occasional     Common     Extremely common 
 
13. How often is social media censorship discussed in China? 
 
           1     2       3    4             5 
       Never         Not often  Sometimes     Often    Extremely often 
 
14. How likely are you to voice any criticism about the regime on Chinese social media 
platforms (ex. policies, leaders)? 
 
           1     2       3    4             5 
       Never        Not likely   Neutral         Likely      Extremely likely 
 
15. How likely are you to comment about social media censorship on a social media 
platform? 
 
           1     2       3    4             5 
      Never          Not likely            Neutral         Likely     Extremely likely 
 
 
 
 
